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Commentary
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev
University of Haifa, Israel
Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron. 2021. “Emotions: Theories and Moral Value.”
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 3, no. 1: 5-9. https://doi.org/10.33497/2021.summer.2.
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev © 2021.
Author email: aaron.benzeev[at]gmail.com
Abstract: This excellent book offers a clearly articulated and convincing perspective on basic disputes in the philosophy of emotions. Although it deals with complex issues, it presents them in an engaging manner. This commentary focuses on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I will not discuss the many issues concerning Brady’s view which I fully embrace, but rather focus on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I argue that Brady’s classification of emotional components and emotional theories are problematic. I also basically agree with Brady’s view on the role of emotions in morality; but, following Spinoza, I further develop this view.
Keywords: emotional theories, morality, cognition, evaluation, virtue, and intuition
Introductory books are not easy to write. One must summarize in a fair manner other people’s views while presenting one’s own, which is often contrary to the views of those others. Michael Brady (2019) does a good job of both explaining his own views and those of whom he opposes. His discussion is well-written, deep, and balanced. This excellent book offers a clearly articulated and convincing perspective on basic disputes in the philosophy of emotions. Although it deals with complex issues, it presents them in an engaging manner. I agree with most of Brady’s main claims: that emotions are extremely important for human beings; emotions are valuable in many cases where they run counter to rational thinking; without emotions we would not develop morally and could not be virtuous; and that without emotions we would fail to engage with works of art, literature and music. Brady rightly claims, contrary to a prevailing view, that emotions are of great importance to our truth-seeking activities. Moreover, without emotions, a whole realm of value would be lost or inaccessible to us. I will not discuss the many issues concerning Brady’s view which I fully embrace, but rather focus on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I argue that Brady’s
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classification of emotional components and emotional theories are problematic. I also basically agree with Brady’s view on the role of emotions in morality; but, following Spinoza, I further develop this view.
EMOTIONAL COMPONENTS AND THEORIES
Brady identifies six components (or elements) that make up emotions: (i) perception, (ii) evaluation, (iii) a bodily change and expression, (iv) a feeling, (v) motivation to act, and (vi) thinking and attending. Based on these identifications, he distinguishes between three major types of theories of emotions: (a) feeling theories, (b) cognitive theories, and (c) perceptual theories.
Although Brady seems to follow a common formulation, I believe that both distinctions, as well as the connection between them, are problematic. To begin with, it is unclear what the criteria are for being included on each list, and whether these criteria overlap. Thus, concerning the first list, perception and thinking, as well as memory and imagination, involve evaluation. Bodily (including cerebral) changes are on a different level of description and exist in all mental phenomena. The absence of memory and imagination, which are essential in emotional experiences, is obvious in the first list. And if these are the six major components, why do we not have six related major types of theories? For example, why are motivational (action readiness) (e.g., Frijda 2007) and thinking theories (e.g., Nussbaum 2001) missing from Brady’s list of major theories? Brady also speaks about two temporal aspects of evaluation, that is, present and future, suggesting that evaluation may be part of the “after the fact” perspective, rather than in the experience itself. What about the past dimension?
The structure of the list of theories is also hard to understand. Perception is commonly regarded in philosophy and psychology as a major cognitive capacity, but it is not part of the cognitive theories. Brady rightly criticizes (extreme versions) of the three theories he proposes (i.e., feeling, cognitive, and perceptual), suggesting that each of them is valid for only a specific group of emotions. He is aware of the explanatory limitation of his proposal, but believes that this is the best way to cope with the vast complexity associated with emotions. The status of the evaluative component in emotions is complex. Brady includes evaluation, but not cognition, in the list of emotional components, and includes cognitive, but not evaluative, theories in the list of major emotional theories. This may suggest a problematic understanding of these concepts. An extreme evaluative theory is one that assumes an actual judgmental process proceeding the experience. A subtler approach claims that emotional experiences have an inherent evaluative tone, without assuming actual judgments as the cause of this experience. As an alternative, I would suggest that all mental modes of reference, cognition, evaluation, motivation and feeling, exist in all emotions, though various emotions may differ with respect to the intensity and nature of these modes as well as in the associated mental capacities, namely, perception, memory, imagination, and thinking. Such a view maintains both the aspect of generality and the distinctive features of each emotion.
To offer just one example of a different, apparently more consistent, classification, I have suggested distinguishing between mental capacities, such as perception, memory, imagination, and thought, and mental modes of reference, such as cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling. I have proposed to include in the basic emotional components four modes of reference, namely, cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; 2017). The cognitive component consists (in its narrow sense) of information about the given circumstances; the evaluative component involves assessment of the personal significance of this information;
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the motivational component addresses our desires, or readiness to act, in the given circumstances, and the feeling component is a kind of consciousness associated with our own state. The various mental capacities are also included in actual emotional experiences. In light of the various components, we can speak about cognitive theories (such as perceptual, e.g., read Tappolet 2016; read also Deigh 1994), evaluative theories (appraisal theories, e.g., read Nussbaum 2001), motivational theories (such as action readiness, e.g., Frijda 2007) and feeling theories (such as James-Lange theory, read e.g., Cannon 1927). The cognitive, evaluative, and motivational are often included within the cognitivist-evaluative approach, whose main opponent is the feeling approach.
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN MORALITY
Brady is right in emphasizing the role of emotions in everyday life, even if in some cases, mainly those of emotional excess, this is a negative impact. Hence, he opposes the prevailing claim that since rational thinking is what distinguishes humans from animals, we should always prefer in our decision-making processes thinking over emotions. Brady shows the value of emotions in various realms. For example, people take us and our promises more seriously if an emotion is part of our attitude.
The role of emotions is particularly interesting in the fields of morality and art. Contrary to Kant, Brady argues that emotions are extremely important in our moral behavior. The presence of love, for example, significantly enhances our trust in others. Brady further argues that emotions are clearly not sufficient for promoting our wellbeing, but they are necessary for this wellbeing; emotions are essential for being a good person.
In this regard, Brady takes, and rightly so in my opinion, an Aristotelian, rather than Kantian, position concerning the connection between morality and emotions. Aristotle introduces a distinction between the “continent” or “self-controlled” type of person and the one who is fully virtuous. The continent person, knowing what she should do, does it, contrary to her emotional tendencies and desires. The fully virtuous person, knowing what she should do, does it, in accordance with such tendencies and desires. In Aristotle’s view, the fully virtuous person is morally superior to the merely self-controlled one. For Aristotle, a virtuous person is one who not only acts virtuously, but also has the appropriate emotional dispositions and affective traits while doing so. Kant seems to draw the same distinction as Aristotle, but weights it the other way—the self-controlled agent is considered to be morally superior, for she acts without any emotional inclination, but for the sake of duty alone (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 13; Kant, 1785, I; also read Hursthouse, 1999). This characterization of virtuous people makes them “experts” of morality in the sense that they know, in a spontaneous and intuitive manner, what is good and bad. Is such knowledge merely emotional? I do not think so. I agree with Brady’s claim that an essential moral difference between virtuous people and ordinary people is their sensitivity. Virtuous people are less sensitive to immoral temptations and are more sensitive to moral wrongdoing.
Following Spinoza’s lead, we can discuss three major cognitive systems: emotional intuition, deliberative thinking, and intuitive reasoning (Spinoza, 1677: IIp40s1, 2; IIp47; V5p33). Although deliberative thinking generally has more cognitive value than emotional intuition, there is yet another
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intuitive system, which can be termed “intuitive reasoning,” the value of which is generally higher than that of the deliberative system. Taken together, the first two systems yield the third system, that of intuitive reasoning. In this sense, emotions play an essential, but not exclusive, role in knowledge, and sometimes not the crucial one. I believe that this accords well with Brady’s view on emotions.
CONCLUSION
My differences with Brady on various aspects of the nature of emotions hardly affect my admiration of his insightful discussions, which include such interesting topics as emotion and understanding; emotion and action; emotions and social groups; and emotion, morality, and art. I highly recommend the book.
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References
Aristotle. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Revised Oxford translation. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ben-Ze’ev, A. 2000. The Subtlety of Emotions. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.
Ben-Ze’ev, A. 2017. “The Thing Called Emotion: A Subtle Perspective.” In Philosophy of Emotion, volume I, edited by A. Ben-Ze’ev and A. Krebs, 112-137. London: Routledge.
Brady, M. 2018. Emotion: The Basics. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Cannon, W. 1927. “The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A Critical Examination and an Alternative Theory." The American Journal of Psychology 39: 106–124.
Deigh, J. 1994. “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.” Ethics 104: 824–854.
Frijda, N. H. 2007. The Laws of Emotion. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Hursthouse, R. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kant, I. (1785) 1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: A Theory of the Emotions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Spinoza, B. 1677. Ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tappolet, C. 2016. Emotions, Value and Agency. Oxford, UK: Oxford university Press.
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