Commentary
Grief and the Emotion
Grief and the Emotion
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev
University of Haifa, IL
Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron. 2022. “Grief and the Emotion.”
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 4, no. 1: 13-17. https://doi.org/10.33497/2022.summer.3.
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Abstract: Cholbi suggests three unique features of grief which are “unlike most emotional conditions”: (1) grief is a concatenation of affective states rather than a single such state, (2) grief is not a perception-like state but a form of affectively-laden attention directed at its object, and (3) grief is an activity with an inchoate aim. While I essentially accept this characterization, I believe that these arguments are not unique to grief but common to all (or at least most) emotions.
Keywords: vicarious grief, practical identity, mental health, falling in love
Michal Cholbi’s book, Grief: A Philosophical Guide, is an excellent book; it is profound, original, and a pleasure to read (despite its sad topic). The major claims are presented in a clear and persuasive manner. The structure and style of the book are accessible—not merely to philosophers. In what follows, I naturally focus on our disagreements.
GRIEF AND THE EMOTIONS
There are various ways to write a philosophical book on a specific emotion, such as grief. One way is to present a comprehensive theory of emotions, in light of which the specific emotion is analyzed. A second approach is to focus on one emotion and to build a philosophical theory around it. Both ways are legitimate and have their own advantages and disadvantages. One advantage of the second method is the ability to provide a fresh outlook on the topic, while not being bound by a general theory. A disadvantage is the lack of a more comprehensive outlook. It is common among those using the first way to overlook differences between various emotions; likewise, those using the second approach tend to overlook similarities between various, (and often all), emotions.
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Cholbi chose the second approach, and his presentation is characterized by both its advantages and disadvantages. Cholbi presents a detailed and profound account of grief. I applaud Cholbi’s discussion and agree with many of his central claims. However, I do have several concerns regarding his view on “other emotions” (aside from grief). It seems that Cholbi goes out of his way to emphasize the differences between grief and other emotions, thereby underestimating their similarities.
Cholbi suggests three unique features of grief which are “unlike most emotional conditions”: (1) grief is a concatenation of affective states rather than a single such state, (2) grief is not a perception-like state but a form of affectively-laden attention directed at its object, and (3) grief is an activity with an inchoate aim. While I essentially accept this characterization, I believe that these arguments are not unique to grief but common to all (or at least most) emotions.
I believe that all emotions are complex experiences that do not consist of a single state, but rather a cluster of emotions. Thus, guilt may be associated with fear; love may incorporate jealousy, hope, and admiration; and hate may be connected with anger, fear, envy, and contempt. These connections are not accidental, rather they express the fact that each emotional situation is unstable, and our emotions are directed at imaginary and not merely real situations. Thus, great love and joy are associated with possible jealousy and fear stemming from the possibility of losing the beloved (Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 3-5). I also believe that all emotions do not merely create a perception-like state but a more complex evaluative experience, in which the motivational component, expressed in our behavior or behavioral tendencies, is central. This is the reason the title of my major book on emotions is The Subtlety of Emotions (Ben-Ze’ev 2000).
GRIEF’S FOCUS OF CONCERN
Cholbi argues that grief’s formal object, which I consider as its focus of concern, is the bereaved individual’s relationship with the deceased, a relationship that has been invariably transformed by the latter’s death. While I agree that the self has a central place in grief, so does the deceased. We can also experience grief for someone who has no direct relation to us or our lives. For example, I experienced grief while reading about the brutal murder of the Swedish journalist Kim Wall on the submarine of the Danish entrepreneur, Peter Madsen. I have no connection to Kim Wall and my relationship with her will not be transformed by the experience.
The death of our beloved is negatively experienced, not merely because we feel that something within us has died and our life has lost a valuable aspect, but also for the sake of the deceased, whose life has tragically ended. Disregarding the deceased, as a major part of grief, makes grief a too-egocentric emotion. We can find other meaningful relationships that can somehow replace the deceased, but the deceased’s opportunities and horizons have just ended. As in other moral attitudes, in grief the other has its own merit that we should value.
THE EGOCENTRIC ASPECT OF GRIEF
Michal Cholbi argues that “we grieve when and because the death of another person is particularly or acutely significant for us. I will refer to this as the egocentric aspect of grief. Note that this term does not imply that grief is selfish. Grief, I shall argue in this book, is self-concerning, and in a broad sense of the term, self-interested.”
Although I agree that, like all other emotions, grief involves a personal and interested attitude, I believe this is different from being egocentric. Egocentric is defined as “Thinking only of oneself, without regard for the feelings or desires of others” (Oxford English Dictionary). This self-centeredness does not make grief (and emotions in general) egoistic since it does not involve “thinking only of oneself.” In grief, as in other emotions,
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the self-other relation is central. In grief, and in profound love, the two concerns are compatible, so the egoistic nature is not central.
The personal and interested nature of emotions indeed gives rise to the claim that emotions are egoistic. However, since emotions concern not only us, but also others who relate to us—family, friends, people in one’s country—the personal nature of emotions is not necessarily egoistic. Along the same line of thought, Martha Nussbaum argues that the personal nature of emotions does not make them egoistic (Nussbaum 2001, 53).
The extra weight given by Cholbi to the subject in grief is expressed not merely in the claim that grief is essentially egoistic, but also in the major characterization of grief by Cholbi: grief “rests on identity investment.” This seems to be an over-intellectualization of grief. I do not recall myself investing in my identity, at least not in a significant manner, in all major deaths that I have personally experienced: two brothers, parents, close friends and extended relatives dying prematurely. I would rather use the more general, and somewhat vague, notion of “closeness” as the central aspect of grief. It should be emphasized that in “closeness” I refer first and foremost to psychological closeness. In this sense, we can feel psychological closeness toward celebrities, political leaders, and sports heroes, and hence can also grieve the loss of them.
I agree that grief (and other emotions) tell us something important about our nature; however, I would not define the nature of grief as being concerned with self-knowledge. Hence, I consider Cholbi’s claim that “successful grieving culminates in a desirable epistemic condition, self-knowledge,” as highly problematic. The epistemic consideration in emotions is of lesser weight than the evaluative and motivational aspects.
EMOTIONAL THEORIES
Cholbi discerns three classes of emotional theories: (1) bodily awareness, (2) cognitive theories, and (3) perceptual theories. This division is problematic for several reasons. First, there is no mention of a significant class of theories: the motivational ones, according to which the essence of emotions is activity, or action readiness (e.g., Nico Frijda 2007; Jean-Paul Sartre 2015). Cholbi’s failure to add this prevailing class of theories is surprising in light of his claim that grief is an activity. Second, perception is a major cognitive tool, so perceptual theories should be part of the cognitive class. Third, the important evaluative theory is spread over the cognitive and perceptual classes of theories. All these are minor criticisms of Cholbi’s view, as he claims to investigate the nature of grief in a largely theory-neutral way.
THE TEMPORALITY OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES
Cholbi argues that grief is an emotional process, and this makes it a-typical in comparison to most other emotions, which are not helpfully described as kindred processes. Fear, for instance, unfolds over time, but is one state, not many. I believe that the temporal dimension of emotions is much more complex than Cholbi claims, even though his characterization of the temporal dimension of grief is essentially correct.
We can talk about three major types of emotional temporality: (1) acute emotions, (2) extended emotions, and (3) enduring emotions. Acute emotions are brief, almost instantaneous experiences. Extended emotions involve successive repetitions of experiences that are felt to belong to the same emotion—for example, being angry or jealous for hours. Enduring emotions are the longest-lasting of the three and can persist for a lifetime. In addition to the occurrence of acute and extended emotions, enduring emotions involves a qualitative meaningful development (and sometimes deterioration), and a dispositional nature that unfolds over time (Ben-Ze’ev 2019).
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No doubt, grief is often an enduring emotion—but so are love, regret, hate, guilt, shame, and various other emotions. All the characteristics that Cholbi uniquely attributes to grief are present in these emotions, and sometimes, as in the case of romantic love, to an even greater degree. Thus, the aspect of development is more pronounced in love than in grief. Like grief, these enduring emotions also color our environment.
The distinction Cholbi often uses between grief, which is a process and activity, and an emotional state (such as fear, anger, etc.) is problematic. All emotions are not passive states but rather involve dynamic processes and activities. Moreover, grief often involves passivity in light of prominent feelings of helplessness, following an irrevocable loss. All emotions have some duration and are not merely one instantaneous state. Longer duration of an emotion enables more meaningful processes.
THE PARADOX OF GRIEF
Cholbi presents what he terms “the paradox of grief.” The paradox consists of two seemingly contrary claims: (1) Grief feels bad, and so should be avoided or lamented; and (2) grief is valuable such that we ought not avoid it altogether and should be grateful that we grieve.
While the paradox seems interesting, Cholbi’s claim that, “there is no correlative paradox for other comparably stressful life events” (70), is simply wrong. This apparent paradox actually exists in almost all life events (or experiences) concerning negative emotions, such as sadness, regret, anger, fear and shame. All of them involve negative emotion, while at the same time have a positive survival and normative value. I believe that we can formulate the same paradox concerning anger, fear and shame.
To sum up, this is an excellent book on grief, which I highly recommend. The book could be even stronger, if the author paid more attention to the similarity between grief and other emotions, thereby enhancing a general theory of emotions. After all, grief too is an emotion.
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References
Ben-Ze'ev, A. 2000. The Subtlety of Emotions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
______. 2019. The Arc of Love: How Our Romantic Lives Change Over Time. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cholbi, M. 2021. Grief: A Philosophical Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Frijda, N. H. 2007. The Laws of Emotion. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Nussbaum, M. C. 2001. Upheavals of Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sartre, J. P. 2015. Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Oxford, UK: Routledge.
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Aaron Ben-Ze’ev © 2022
Author email: aaron.benzeev[at]gmail.com
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