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Précis
Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion
Cecilea Mun
Independent Scholar
Mun, Cecilea. 2023. “Précis: Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion.”
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 5, no. 1: 1-10. https://doi.org/10.33497/2023.summer.1.
Abstract: In the following précis, I provide a summary of Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion. Much of what I say can be found in the “About the Book” section of my book, although I provide some elaborations here. My summary focuses primarily on the central aim of the book, and the general strategy that I take in order to achieve my aim. What I present is a proposal for an interdisciplinary science of emotion. That proposal goes by the name of meta-semantic pluralisme, and a central principle of this proposal is what I refer to as the α-ωe principle. My summary includes chapter summaries, which provides not only a more detailed account of my general strategy, but also a summary of the fruitfulness of this first principle for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion, including the work it can do in the areas of metaphysics, language, consciousness, intentionality, rationality, and epistemology. Finally, one should note that some of the contents of this précis should also provide a response to at least some of the commentators’ requests for clarification, and I address the concerns not covered in this précis in my subsequent replies.
Keywords: emotions, philosophy of science, interdisciplinary, taxonomy, mind-body problem
What emotions are is the central question for the science of emotion, which includes answering whether emotions constitute a distinct category of experiences compared to judgments, beliefs, perceptions, sensations, affects, feelings, and moods. The central aim of my book is to answer this question by first identifying and arguing for fundamental principles for interdisciplinary research in the science of emotion (broadly construed). These fundamental principles, which constitute my proposed framework for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion, are presented throughout chapters 1-9, and I refer to this framework as meta-semantic pluralism about emotion (meta-semantic pluralisme).[1] The book ends with a sketch of a particular theory of emotion—semantic dualism about emotion (semantic dualisme)—which is only one of the many possible theories of emotion that can be developed under the framework of meta-semantic pluralisme.
Meta-semantic pluralisme also provides an interdisciplinary taxonomy of theories of emotion—the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion—which is intended to facilitate a deeper understanding of the various perspectives regarding what emotions are. In accordance with this taxonomy, the interdisciplinary discourse about what emotions are in the science of emotion can be understood as a debate between four fundamental kinds of approaches to theorizing about emotion: realism, instrumentalism, eliminativism, and eliminative-realism about emotion. As a taxonomy of theories of emotion, however, the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion is not necessarily wedded to meta-semantic pluralisme. In other words, one can accept that the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion accurately reflects the logical space of fundamental kinds of theories of emotion without also accepting meta-semantic pluralisme as the framework with which one approaches their research in the science of emotion. Yet, those who subscribe to meta-semantic pluralisme ought to accept the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion to the extent that it entails at least some of the fundamental ontology and logic of meta-semantic pluralisme.
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I introduce meta-semantic pluralisme as a starting point for unifying theories of emotion across the disciplines, from an interdisciplinary perspective, without consilience.[2] It is both a descriptive and a prescriptive meta-theory about how such interdisciplinary research and theorizing ought to be pursued. It is a descriptive meta-theory to the extent that its fundamental principles are derived from past and current approaches to the science of emotion, and it is a prescriptive meta-theory insofar as it provides fundamental principles for how one ought to define emotion, from an interdisciplinary perspective (this is how is-es become oughts). Accordingly, meta-semantic pluralisme is a meta-framework—a second-order, conceptual framework—for theorizing about theories of emotion. As such, it constitutes a philosophy of science: the philosophy of the science of emotion.
Meta-semantic pluralisme, however, does not attempt to ultimately resolve the problem of underdetermination in the science of emotion, which can be understood as the problem of how, given the totality of evidence that can be collected through human endeavors, one can adjudicate between incommensurable theories that are equally supported by that evidence.[3] This is because the problem of underdetermination is a feature of interdisciplinary research and theorizing rather than a bug. It is a consequence of the alpha-omega principle of interdisciplinary inquiry for the science of emotion (α-ωe), which states that any object of inquiry (specifically within the context of the science of emotion, as indicated by the superscript ‘e’) can be understood from various perspectives and each perspective may yield a distinct view, theory, or language. Furthermore, the truths of each of these perspectives are ultimately united by a shared object of inquiry. To this extent, the interdisciplinary framework proposed in my book is an objectivist framework: it proposes that any adequate, interdisciplinary, scientific theory will necessarily be a true theory (in terms of correspondence). It may also be ambivalent about realism versus nominalism about universals.[4]
The α-ωe principle is the alpha principle because it is the preliminary assumption with which any adequate interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion ought to begin, and it is the omega principle in that it is the final conclusion that ought to be inferable from the complete totality of the results of any adequate interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion. In other words, it is the pillar that runs through the framework of meta-semantic pluralisme, and which leads to an understanding of the science of emotion as an interdisciplinary endeavor of unification without consilience (i.e., without the pursuit of a single, unified language). It is the foundation for my proposed science of emotion, pursued especially from an interdisciplinary perspective, which plays the important role of establishing the fact of a shared object of inquiry. It provides interdisciplinary constraints for the science of emotion, broadly construed, in order to help ensure that those involved in such pursuits are not talking past each other. It explains why scholars from a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, etc., are concerned with the same object of inquiry, and it establishes criteria for evaluating at least some of the adequacies of contemporary and future theories of emotion, pursued from an interdisciplinary perspective.
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES
In chapter 1, I begin my endeavor to answer the question of what emotions are, from an interdisciplinary perspective, by motivating the derivation of the α-ωe principle. I do so by providing a brief summary of the most prominent kinds of philosophical and psychological theories of emotion between the late 20th to the early 21st century: cognitivism, noncognitivism, social constructionism, and embodied cognitivism in philosophy; and basic emotion theory, appraisal theory, social constructivism, and psychological constructionism in psychology. In doing so, I aim to provide non-specialists with a general overview of the philosophical and psychological theories of emotion that this monograph especially addresses, as well as set the stage for subsequent arguments. Furthermore, I demonstrate how the differences in intradisciplinary taxonomies of theories of emotion can lead to skepticism in the interdisciplinary science of emotion, and I argue for the necessity of an alternative interdisciplinary taxonomy of theories of emotion as a response to such skepticism. Finally, I presuppose that emotion scholars all share the same object of inquiry in order to derive the first fundamental principle of meta-semantice pluralism: the alpha-omega principle of interdisciplinary inquiry (α-ωe). Some might regard this to be a viciously circular approach, but if one considers scientific endeavors as a matter of practice rather than simply a matter of logical deductions, and one can say that the sciences have made at least some progress so far in obtaining knowledge, then the approach is not viciously circular, but instead virtuously so. In the remaining chapters, I aim to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the α-ωe principle, and thereby provide a proof for its truth.
Assuming the α-ωe principle, I present and argue for the meta-semantice principle of deep perspective taking for the science of emotion (meta-semantic perspective takinge) throughout chapters 2-3. According to this principle, one must consider the various theoretical perspectives regarding the meaning of the word “emotion,” or the name of a discrete emotion type (e.g., fear, joy, sadness, shame), within a variety of domains of inquiry and levels of analysis when conducting interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion. In doing so, and anticipating Dina Mendonça’s comment about reflexivity and the use of “meta” in my work, we can acknowledge the following levels and contexts of analysis:
Level of Meaning Level of Factors Determining Meaning
Semantic Analysis Meta-Semantic Analysis
SemanticREF Analysis Meta-SemanticREF Analysis
SemanticREF-r Analysis Meta-SemanticTERM Analysis
SemanticREF-i Analysis Meta-SemanticPRAG Analysis
A semantic level of analysis is typically understood as the level in which the meaning of a word is analyzed. An adequate analysis of a relevant word, such as the word “emotion,” may amount to a definite description or a concept, but the primary aim is to give an account of the meaning of a word (e.g., “emotion”). We can, however, understand the semantics of a word in accordance with a referential (REF) perspective, which is the perspective in which one seeks to provide an analysis of the referent of the meaning of a word. A referential perspective (REF) can also be differentiated into at least two kinds: referential reflexive (REF-r) and referential interpretive (REF-i). The difference is that a referential reflexive (REF-r) perspective is the perspective in which the context is a subject’s own theory of emotion, folk or otherwise. In other words, when I speak of what emotions are from my theoretical perspective, or even when I am speaking of emotions from my own personal perspective, I am invoking the meaning of the word “emotion” from a semantic referential (since the meaning is about the referent of a word) and reflexive (since the relevant meaning is set by the context of the speaker’s meaning) perspective (REF-r) at the meaning (semantic) level of analysis.
We can also ask what factors influence the semantics of a word, and when we do so, we are then entering a meta-semantic level of analysis. At the meta-semantic level of analysis we can ask questions about the ontology of the referent to which a theory might refer. To do so might be to ask questions from the meta-semanticREF perspective of analysis, which is the perspective of thinking about the ontology
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of the referent of a particular term. For example, one might question whether the word “emotion,” given a particular theoretical perspective, might refer to an objective kind or a subjective kind of some sort. One can also ask about the meta-semanticTERM perspective, in which the question is not about the ontology of the referent of a word (e.g., the referent of the word “emotion”), but instead about the extent to which ordinary language intuitions ought to influence scientific decision-making about the meaning of a technical word. There are at least two positions that can be taken from the meta-semanticTERM perspective: 1) optimism about ordinary language words, and 2) pessimism about ordinary language words. There is also the meta-semantic pragmatic perspective (meta-semanticPRAG), which is about how practices and conventions influence the meaning of a word.
Given the above, one can derive the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion, which helps to establish the fact that at least some scholars in the science of emotion share a primary object of inquiry. It does so by illustrating how different theories of emotion from across the disciplines, as well as within a single discipline, can be unified with some and differentiated from other theories of emotion. Yet, one might ask how the problem of skepticism is to be avoided given that the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion helps to demonstrate only that some emotion scholars share the same object of inquiry, across the disciplines or within a single discipline. One might also ask how we can avoid the problem of skepticism given the existence of equally viable contrary or contradictory theories of emotion, as illustrated by the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion. I, therefore, argue in chapter 4 for the fundamental base for interdisciplinary inquiry in the science of emotion (Basee), which is the principle that regardless of whether or not emotion researchers share the same position on what emotions are from the semantic referential perspective (e.g., “emotion” refers to a psycho-physical brain state or mental state), the meta-semantic referential perspective (e.g., emotion is an objective kind or a subjective kind), or from a meta-semantic terminological perspective (e.g., optimism or pessimism about ordinary language), an adequate theory of emotion must recognize that ordinary intuitions about emotions serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the general explananda for the science of emotion.
I do so by arguing that the philosophical and psychological theories of emotion that fall under the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion all adhere to Basee, and observe that the reason why they do so is because ordinary intuitions about emotions ultimately serve to anchor the science of emotion as an objective science. I also argue that Basee is logically distinct from optimism about ordinary language emotion terms by demonstrating how those theories that do not subscribe to optimism (eliminative-realism and eliminativism) still imply the truth of Basee.
An interdisciplinary science of emotion must also be one that can unify both materialistic and mentalistic perspectives. So, in chapter 5, I argue for what I refer to as semantic dualism about the mind, body, and their relation, which is a kind of reductive, type, identity theory about psycho-physical explanations. I do so by first noting the significance of the mind-body problem for the science of emotion, and then by introducing David Chalmers’ (1996, 2020a) hard problem and meta problem of consciousness (2018, 2020b). I then argue against an eliminative materialist, eliminativist, and interaction dualist response to these problems, and I provide my proposed solution in the form of semantic dualism.
Semantic dualism maintains that the mental states (broadly construed, including as processes) that are referred to by a mentalistic language (e.g., “beliefs,” “desires,” “emotions,” “pains,” “hungers,” etc.) are constitutively and definitionally “reducible” to the integrated sum of the material components of these states.[5] As such, the integrated sum of the material components of these states are merely an account of these states in a materialistic language (e.g., component neural activity, allostatic activity, sensory-motor activity, etc.). I also argue in favor of semantic dualism by responding to the meta-problem of consciousness. In short, I argue that the intuition,
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feeling, or belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness is an illusion, which can be explained by the operation of the mechanisms that are responsible for our causal attributions.[6] I conclude by proposing semantic dualism as a fundamental principle for interdisciplinary research and theorizing, and subsequent chapters (6-10) can be understood as elaborating on this fundamental principle and solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
I also offer a sketch of a theory of emotion in chapter 10, which I refer to as “semantic dualisme.” Yet, this particular theory of emotion, which subsumes the framework of meta-semantic pluralisme, is not an essential aspect of semantic dualism since semantic dualism, which is a theory about the relationship between the mind and the body rather than a theory of emotion, can be a foundation for a variety of significantly differentiated theories of emotion. Semantic dualism, along with the α-ωe principle, however, does entail that meta-semantic pluralisme, along with semantic dualisme, are objectivist frameworks, even given that they fundamentally categorize theories of emotion as realist, instrumentalist, eliminativist, and eliminative-realist theories. In short, realist, instrumentalist, eliminativist, and eliminative-realist theories should accept that there is a fact of the matter (in terms of correspondence) as to whether or not their theories are at least falsifiable. Meta-semantic pluralisme proposes that it is at least this feature of objectivity that demarcates a science from a non-science.
The notion of intentionality is also a central notion in the philosophy of emotion, but not necessarily in the psychology of emotion. Given this, in chapter 6, I identify one of the major philosophical concerns, especially in the philosophy of mind, regarding the notion of intentionality—the problem of original intentionality—and I provide an explanation of the general import of this notion: it concerns questions about what constitutes a genuine mental life. Furthermore, my analysis suggests that a solution to the problem of original intentionality entails responding to the following four questions: 1) what is the explanandum of original intentionality; 2) what is the genus of original intentionality; 3) what is the differentia of original intentionality; and 4) how does original intentionality fit into a natural and hopefully scientific understanding of the world?
By relying on Terry Horgan’s (2013) argument for his proposed meaning of “original intentionality,” I move on to identify the referent of “original intentionality” as the phenomenon of understanding. I also identify the genus of original intentionality as having a genuine mental life, and I provide a proof of the existence of original intentionality (i.e., I help the reader identify the explanandum of original intentionality). I also rely on some of Galen Strawson’s (2004, 2008) arguments for his proposed notion of intentionality (i.e., “genuine” or “real” intentionality) in order to argue in favor of an alternative account of “original intentionality,” one which maintains the phenomena of understanding as an essential feature.
More specifically, I argue that Strawson’s notion of aboutness—which is also shared by Daniel Dennett (1983, 1987, 1992, 2009)—can be understood as constituting the genus of original intentionality: intentionality simpliciter. Furthermore, aboutness can be differentiated in terms of degrees of integration into a spectrum of subcategories of intentionality, with derived intentionality (as with the intentionality of atoms, rocks, sedimentary layers, and reflections in a mirror) at one end of the spectrum and underived intentionality (as with the intentionality of living beings) at the other. Underived intentionality can also be differentiated in terms of degrees of integration, with primitive underived intentionality (e.g., of perhaps viruses) at one end and reflective underived intentionality (e.g., of beings with self-awareness, which necessarily entails an awareness of others) at the other end. Finally, the positive differentia (i.e., essence) of original intentionality—a positive account of what makes original intentionality the kind of intentionality that it is—can be defined as reflective intentionality, which is what Horgan takes to be the phenomenology of understanding and what Strawson takes to be “genuine” or “real” intentionality. The negative differentia of original intentionality—an account of what original intentionality is not as a member of its genus, which negatively defines what it is—can be defined by the conjunction of underived primitive, naturally derived, artificially derived, and naturally underived intentionality.
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In chapter 7, I discuss the debate between cognitivists and noncognitivists about emotion within the area of philosophy of emotion, and I isolate the relation between aspects of the world (real or imagined) and how they bear on a subject’s well-being as the essence of what makes emotions intentional qua emotion. I refer to this principle about how aspects of the world bear on our well-being as the fundamental intentionality thesis of emotions (FITe), and I explain how, due to the way in which the notion of intentionality has been typically understood within philosophy—as being significantly influenced by Franz Brentano’s notion of intentionality as the mark of the mental—it is typically thought that the intentionality of emotions falls within the domain of the discipline of philosophy and outside the discipline of psychology. Armed with my alternative notion of intentionality (as proposed in chapter 6), semantic dualism (as proposed in chapter 5), and the fundamental intentionality thesis of emotions (which is derived in the earlier sections of chapter 7), I argue that the psychology of emotion is also replete with concerns regarding the intentionality of emotions. I conclude this chapter by arguing for the FITe as a fundamental principle for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion, broadly construed.
The intentionality of emotions is intimately intertwined with the rationality of emotions, although they are distinct notions. In chapter 8, I begin with a discussion of a variety of emotional experiences which demonstrate how emotions can be understood as being at times rational and at times irrational. I then go on to explain how the rationality of emotions can be understood in terms of their evaluative rationality, their epistemic rationality, and their ontological rationality, which allow us to know in at least three ways, and I argue for the acceptance of these notions as fundamental principles for the interdisciplinary science of emotion. Along the way, I derive the standard criterion for the rationality of emotions, the criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions, and the superordinate inference rule for a discrete emotion type, and I provide an argument for the controversial notion of the ontological rationality of emotions. For the sake of brevity, and perhaps also to peak the reader’s interest, I will leave it to the reader to look further into these concepts. I conclude with a discussion of how the ontological rationality of emotions is related to both the intentionality of emotions and the notion of an emotion’s formal object.
In chapter 9, I argue for reconceiving the structure of rationality in accordance with semantic dualism, and suggest that this alternative account presents a more suitable response to the cognitivist’s problem of recalcitrant emotions in the philosophy of emotion. According to my alternative account of the structure of rationality, being rational and being irrational can both be dimensionally defined along two axes: the axis of integration and the axis of recalcitrance. The axis of integration can be understood in terms of the density of the amount of unified information processing that occurs in a rational being, and the axis of recalcitrance refers to the susceptibility of a state (e.g., a belief, emotion, perception, or sensation) to warranting evidence. Furthermore, I argue that some states are recalcitrantly rational, such as universal truths, while others are recalcitrantly irrational (e.g., a disabled subject’s inability to recognize a fearful situation as fearful). In doing so, I provide a general mapping of rationality and the ways in which emotions can be rational, irrational, and arational. I also complete the elaboration of my solution to the hard problem of consciousness (semantic dualism), and my argument for the framework of meta-semantic pluralism as an interdisciplinary foundation for a science of emotion.
To motivate my proposal for reconceiving the structure of rationality, I begin by providing an additional argument for the unification of materialistic theories of emotion and mentalistic theories of emotion. I argue that an embodied cognitive framework—such as semantic dualism, and as a consequence meta-semantic pluralisme and semantic dualisme—is a more suitable framework for interdisciplinary research and theorizing about emotions compared to both philosophical noncognitive and cognitive frameworks. To do so, I critique Jesse J. Prinz’s (2004) noncognitive, perceptual, embodied-appraisal theory of emotion, and I argue that converting his theory into a cognitive, perceptual, embodied-appraisal theory would provide a more consistent theory of emotion, especially with respect to elucidating a theory in which the intentionality of an emotion is
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represented by an emotional experience rather than in an emotional experience. I then critique Martha C. Nussbaum’s (2001) cognitive theory of emotion by arguing that the significance of value in our emotional experiences demonstrates that embodied feelings are ineliminable for an adequate theory of emotion. These conclusions are the implications of semantic dualism, applied within the context of an interdisciplinary science of emotion.
In chapter 10, I provide a sketch of a particular kind of theory of emotion, which I refer to as semantic dualism about emotion (semantic dualisme). Meta-semantic pluralisme is the approach to the science of emotion that semantic dualisme takes. To this extent, semantic dualisme is a particular kind of meta-semantic pluralist theory of emotion. Semantic dualisme is also a realist theory of emotion. It regards emotion to be a legitimate object of scientific inquiry (broadly construed), and argues that the term “emotion” names a kind of embodied language that is a purely-objective kind (i.e., is possibly independent of human conceptualizations). To this extent, semantic dualisme is a kind of nativist theory (for an introduction to nativism, refer to Fodor 1975). One should also note that although these are all features of semantic dualisme, they need not be features of all meta-semantic pluralistice theories of emotion.
According to semantic dualisme, emotions are embodied cognitions that represent how aspects of the world bear on a subject’s well-being, and as such they constitute an embodied language. I also explain how they are distinct from, yet related to sensations, affects and other affectively laden experiences (such as hunger and moods), and meta-emotions. I also explain how the language of adult human emotions can be differentiated from the language of human infant emotions, and perhaps also non-human animal emotions, by appealing to the difference in the integration of the information of their intentionality. Emotions can also be experienced as a sub-personal process, an automatic (i.e., pre-reflective) conscious experience of which one is not aware, an automatic conscious experience of which one is aware, a deliberate conscious experience of which one is aware, or a pretense emotion. Emotions are not only active, but we can become aware of the exercise of our free-will when we experience our emotions as actions, through deliberate, conscious experiences of emotion regulation. I also observe how, in virtue of this fact and their evaluative rationality, emotions constitute the crown jewel of cognition and are essential to ethical considerations.[8]
Finally, I note that the discourse on emotion is constituted by concerns regarding at least three sub-categories of a language of emotion: a first-order language of emotion (i.e., emotional experiences), a second-order language of emotion (i.e., a language of emotion words, which can also be a theory of emotion), and a meta-theoretical language of emotion (i.e., a language about theories of emotion).[7] My joy, sorrow, anger, and shame—as experiences—are, therefore, a kind of language: the first-order language of emotion. Any theory that purports to give some account of emotion or an emotion entails a theory, to some extent, of emotion as a universal, at least in the sense discussed by Armstrong (1978a; 1978b) or Lewis (1983). Each theory of emotion is a second-order language of emotion, including a folk language of emotion. Meta-semantic pluralisme is a meta-theoretical language of emotion; it is a theory (a language) about theories (a language) of emotion. One of its principles is that theories of emotion can be placed into the fundamental categories of realism, instrumentalism, eliminativism, and eliminative-realism. The names of these categories can be understood as constituting at least some aspects of a meta-semantic pluraliste language of emotion: a meta-language for the science of emotion.
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Notes
[1] The superscript ‘e’ (as in meta-semantic pluralisme) stands for the context of the science of emotion. So, any technical term with the superscript ‘e’ at the end of the term should be read as indicating the context for interpreting the principle to which the term refers within the context of the science of emotion. Furthermore, my reason for using superscripts to demarcate the context for a given principle is to leave open the possibility of applying these principles more generally for scientific endeavors.
[2] I say, “without consilience,” here for two reasons. First, my intention is to indicate that meta-semantic pluralisme is not a framework which requires all theories to be expressed in any single language, such as the language of a particular discipline. Second, it is an acknowledgement of at least some of the history of the attempts at unification in the sciences, more specifically, Edward O. Wilson’s (1998) Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge.
[3] This problem can be understood as the problem of underdetermination in the sciences, and interest in this topic can be traced back to debates between Carnap and Quine on analyticity and synonymy. One place to start learning about the problem of underdetermination is with Willard V. O. Quine’s (1990) Pursuit of Truth.
[4] I am using David M. Armstrong’s (1978a; 1978b) notion of “realism” and “nominalism.”
[5] One might ask exactly what an integrated sum is, and I would say that a precise statement is not currently available, although people have and still are working on it. But regardless, I will say that it is at least this much: all the necessary components integrated to the extent that it can give rise to the naming of that experience as some kind (e.g., “emotion” or “consciousness”).
[6] Note that I do not address the problem of identifying or explaining how consciousness arises given the presupposition that dualism is true since I reject any kind of ontological dualism.
[7] I’d like to take this moment to clarify a point in my monograph. In my monograph, I indicated that emotions were either a first-, second-, or third-order language: “Like any language, emotions—as a first–, second-, and third-order language—are also actions” (Mun 2021, 275). Here, I seem to suggest that emotions are a first-, second-, and third-order language. This is incorrect. Emotions are a first-order language, which can be spoken of through a second-order language (the language of emotion words). The third-order language, which is a meta-theoretical language (e.g., the language of meta-semantic pluralisme), is also a kind of language, but it is not an emotion, as with the first-order language of emotion. It is more like a second-order language of emotion. It is a language about theories of emotion. The use of all three of these languages is, nevertheless, a kind of action.
[8] I’d like to thank Palgrave Macmillan for permission to reuse sections from my text. Much of what is presented in this précis can be found in the “About the Book” section of the book; although I’ve included some clarifications and additional notes.
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Cecilea Mun © 2023
Author email: cecileamun[at]icloud.com
