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Author’s Replies
Cecilea Mun
Independent Scholar
Mun, Cecilea. 2023. “Replies to Maiese and Mendonça.”
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 5, no. 1: 31-49. https://doi.org/10.33497/2023.summer.4.
Abstract: I begin with my replies to Michelle Maiese, especially with respect to the hard problem of consciousness, my version of reductive-realism, my version of a type-identity theory, my version of an embodied cognitive theory, and questions regarding exactly what an enactive or embodied theory entails. I also address Dina Mendonça’s concerns about cultural diversity in the study of emotion, in the section on reductive realism, type-identity theory, and objectivity in the science of emotion. I then move on to addressing the concerns raised by Mendonça on meta-emotions, reflexivity, and the third kind of language of emotion (a meta-language). In summary, I hope these replies give the reader a better idea of meta-semantic pluralisme, semantic dualism, semantic dualisme, including the various ways in which they might contribute to the discourse on the mind, emotion, and meta-emotions, as well as some inspiration for their own research and future publications.
Keywords: hard problem of consciousness, reductive realism, type-identity theory, natural laws, universals, language, embodied cognition, enactivism, meta-emotions, reflexivity, intentionality
I would like to first thank both Michelle Maiese and Dina Mendonça for their commentaries. I appreciate how they recognized the uniqueness of my contributions, and I welcome them pressing me on the features of my account that go against the grain compared to pre-existing theories of mind and emotion. The positions I take are intentional and calculated. They are additional contributions that I aim to make, not only in the philosophy of mind and emotion, but also to an interdisciplinary science of emotion. I
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begin with my replies to Maiese, especially with respect to the hard problem of consciousness, my version of reductive-realism, my version of a type-identity theory, my version of an embodied cognitive theory, and questions regarding exactly what an enactive or embodied theory entails. I also address Mendonça’s concerns about cultural diversity in the study of emotion, in the section on reductive realism, type-identity theory, and objectivity in the science of emotion. I then move on to addressing the concerns raised by Mendonça on meta-emotions, reflexivity, and the third kind of language of emotion (a meta-language).
THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS, REDUCTIVE REALISM, AND THE ORIGINS OF LIFE
With respect to the hard problem of consciousness, Maiese’s concerns and questions can be summarized as a concern about how my response to the hard problem of consciousness is an adequate response.
First, as noted in my analysis of the hard problem of consciousness and the meta hard problem of consciousness, it is important to understand that both problems entail a different kind of solution depending on the theoretical perspective from which the problem is being addressed. As I argued in the book, it is, therefore, unreasonable for one to ask someone like a reductive-realist to provide the kind of solution that would sufficiently solve these problems from an alternative perspective. In short, the question of exactly how material processes give rise to mental activity, as conceived by someone like David Chalmers (1996, 2018, 2020a, 2020b), does not arise for a reductive-realist like me. The hard problem conceived in these terms is a “problem” for an interaction dualist, strong emergentist, or property dualist to “solve”; although it should be more accurately characterized as a problem that such theorists should want to maintain since a consequence of solving such a problem, from the perspective of any one of these views, would be the collapse of such a view into a kind of reductive-realist view.
For a reductive-realist, there is no mystery as to how consciousness arises from material processes over and above the kind of explanation provided by the sciences, broadly construed, and if there is any such mystery, it is beyond the scope of human knowledge. To this extent, given that the science of emotion is concerned with knowledge—specifically human knowledge—such questions are outside the scope of the science of emotion. This conclusion, of course, does not relegate possible answers to such questions as meaningless, useless, or not involving some kind of knowledge. I have a high respect for religion and for wholly speculative areas of philosophy. They are, for many, important sources of value, meaning, and knowledge, not only for an individual’s life, but also for pursuing knowledge in the sciences. Yet, I believe that boundaries are necessary, especially given the limitations of humanity and the aim of scientific endeavors.
For a reductive realist, and especially a semantic dualist, it is simply a matter of fact that some living beings are conscious as a consequence of the way that such information (e.g., physical, chemical, biological, psychological, and social) is processed by the material constituents of a living, conscious being. If the question, however, is for me to specify exactly what these processes are, my response is that I do not need to (at least not all of it). I am, afterall, human, and therefore have limits. I am, however, working on specifying some of the bio-psycho-social processes involved in some experiences of shame for my next book (pending appropriate funding). This is a feature of the “without consilience” aspect of meta-semantic pluralisme. I recognize the fact that providing such explanations requires a significant degree of knowledge and expertise in a particular area, and there is no need for me (or any single person) to have the same level of knowledge and expertise in all these areas. Such a demand is an impossible demand to meet. No one person can be an expert in all the disciplines and areas which are required to provide a sufficiently complete explanation of the material processes of conscious or emotional experiences. Yet, having some degree of knowledge about what other experts know would be beneficial, encouraged, and necessary for an interdisciplinary approach to the science of the mind and emotion. Given the limited amount of time that any one person has, however, it should be a matter of interest and need that should guide an interdisciplinary scholar’s decision as to which other areas they should be well-versed and to what extent. This is also where meta-semantic pluralisme can be beneficial, especially because one can use the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion to locate allies who can fill in the gaps to one’s theorizing.
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Second, a distinction needs to be made between that of experience, consciousness, and conscious awareness. There is a significant amount of agreement among scholars for whom the material processes of conscious experiences are important: a nervous system is necessary for a living being to have a conscious experience (e.g., Thompson [1991] 2016; LeDoux 2019; and Barrett 2017). A nervous system can be understood as a necessary material component of the material processes of consciousness, especially since it plays the central material function of facilitating information processing throughout a living being’s whole bodily system. It is through a nervous system that information becomes integrated, and it is this kind of integration that allows for conscious experiences. A living being that lacks a nervous system (e.g., bacteria, cells, placozoans, sponges, plants) may have “experiences,” (broadly construed as a living being’s internal and external information processing that is functionally necessary for survival), but not conscious (defined as having experiential existences, yet not necessarily those of which an individual is consciously aware).
Furthermore, although an infant and a blind-sighted person have experiences and are conscious, they may not be consciously aware of some of their experiences since an infant has yet to develop the necessary psychological (in a mentalistic language) components for some forms of conscious awareness (e.g., a conception of a self) and a blind-sighted person lacks a conscious awareness of what they perceive in the blinded region of their visual field. Also, although there is no consensus as to date, I would venture to make the claim that having an active nervous system, under normal conditions, is sufficient for having a conscious experience, although only a necessary condition for having an experience in which one is consciously aware. A consciously aware experience would require several components that can be more easily specified in a mentalistic language (e.g., attention, memory, perceptions, a self-conception, etc.), but may also be described in terms of a materialistic language (e.g., the language of neuroscience, neuroanatomy, and neurophysiology). A dynamic system’s approach to consciousness would also be welcomed (refer to Colombetti 2014). Yet, it should be recognized that not all experiences are conscious experiences, and not all conscious experiences are experiences of which one is consciously aware, although all these kinds of experiences are involved in the integrated material processes that give rise to consciously aware experiences.
In noting that I maintain that “conscious experiences are not simply the total sum of the necessary and sufficient material conditions that constitute them; rather, the integrated sum total of the material processes that constitute conscious experiences constitute information that is above and beyond the simple sum of its parts” (Maiese 2023, in this issue), Maiese may be more interested in the difference I draw between the total sum of necessary and sufficient conditions versus the integrated total sum of necessary and sufficient conditions. My point in making this distinction is to call attention to the notion of integration, specifically the idea that the components of a conscious experience must be unified through a specified, integrated, organization of its parts, and that a simple sum of its parts without some kind of integrated organization would fail. A sum can be had in many ways, and none of these ways need to be integrated.
In the great debate between global neuronal workspace theory (GNW) and integrated information theory (IIT), I threw my hat in with IIT (Mun 2021, 132), and the principle of integration is one of its major axioms. As noted by Melloni et al. (2023):
The five axioms of IIT are intrinsic existence, composition, information, integration, and exclusion. Briefly, intrinsicality means that every experience is subjective—for the intrinsic perspective of the subject of experience, rather than for something extrinsic to it. Composition means that every experience is structured, being composed of phenomenal distinctions and relations, rather than without content. Information means that every experience is the specific way it is, rather than generic. Integration means that every experience is unitary, being irreducible to independent components,
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rather than multiple. Finally, exclusion means that every experience is definite—it contains what it contains, rather than having no definite border and grain. (Melloni et. al 2023, e0268577)
It is also important to note that although I am betting on IIT, generally speaking, semantic dualism is also not necessarily wedded to IIT, and it explicitly rejects panpsychist versions given that it postulates the necessity of a nervous system as part of the integrative architecture required for consciousness. This is because semantic dualism is necessarily about animal minds, and the fundamental principle that is relevant here is the principle of integration producing states that are over and above the simple sum of component parts. How such integration is actually achieved is a matter of scientific discovery and not a matter of the foundations for such scientific endeavors.
Also, as reported by Melloni et al., both GNW and IIT are undergoing what is referred to as an adversarial collaboration to test the GNW and IIT. Tests are currently ongoing, so there is no definitive answer as of yet, but much progress has been made since earlier years when Giulio Tenoni presented his view at a consciousness conference in Tuscon, AZ, several years ago, including developments of various versions of IIT. Adversarial collaborations also have the potential of exemplifying the approach of meta-semantic pluralisme, according to which interdisciplinary research and theorizing is a cooperative project where individuals virtuously contribute the extent of their knowledge and expertise in order to, as a cooperative effort, understand the shared object of inquiry. As to whether or not an adversarial collaboration actually does will depend on a variety of factors, including whether it implements some of the other principles proposed by meta-semantic pluralisme, specifically the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary inquiry (4C): the principle of clarity, the principle of cooperation, the principle of multi-modal confirmation and falsification, and the principle of intellectual conscientiousness (Mun 2021, xxii). This is, as I understand things, the only way any kind of unification of any kind of science can be done.
REDUCTIVE REALISM, TYPE-IDENTITY THEORY, AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE SCIENCE OF EMOTION
As mentioned in my introductory summary, semantic dualism is an embodied-cognitivist, reductive-realist, weak emergent, type-identity theory of the relation between the mind and the body, and semantic dualism about emotion (semantic dualisme) is a particular embodied cognitive, reductive-realist, weak emergent, type-identity theory about emotions. Furthermore, one should note that semantic dualism rather than semantic dualisme is what I posit as a principle for an interdisciplinary, unified science of emotion (meta-semantic pluralisme). Semantic dualisme is a particular theory of emotion, which I sketched in chapter 10.
For many people, including Maiese, my proposal for semantic dualism as a unifying principle may come as a surprise since, as indicated by Maiese’s comments, some of the views of semantic dualism are alone controversial, and perhaps doubly so when unified into a single approach. My response is that this is one way semantic dualism seeks to carve out its own logical space among pre-existing theories of consciousness, embodied cognitive theories of emotion, and philosophies of the science of emotion. As such, it is another contribution I seek to make not only in the philosophy of the science of emotion, but also in the philosophy of mind.
To the extent that semantic dualisms is a kind of type-identity theory, I’d like to add that these concerns can be understood against the background of the same kind of concerns that motivated philosophers such as Hilary Putnam (1973, [1967] 1975, 1975), David M. Armstrong (1978a, 1978b), Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter, and Elizabeth W. Prior (1982), David Lewis ([1983] 1999), and Saul A. Kripke (1997), as well as Ruth Millikan (1984, 2017), Jerry Fodor (1975, 1983, 1986). The concerns in these works can be briefly summarized as concerns having to do with what one might call the problem of the one and the many (refer to Chen 2021),
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which can range from discussions about universals, natural kinds, and natural laws to discussions about the language with which these are spoken, scientific or otherwise. Unfortunately, I will not elaborate on these concerns here, although I hope to do so in a forthcoming paper.
Within the context of these concerns, one might argue that meta-semantic pluralisme offers a way to unify many theories of emotion. For example, as I argued in chapter 9, given meta-semantic pluralisme, one can also unify non-cognitive theories like Jesse J. Prinz’s with cognitive theories like Martha C. Nussbaum’s (2001), given that each theory is revised in accordance with semantic dualism. Lisa F. Barrett’s (2017) psychological account may also be allied with Nussbaum’s cognitive theory of emotion, as suggested by the analysis for the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion. It also might be possible to unite Colombetti’s dynamic systems view with semantic dualisme. Such unifications would be an aim of meta-semantic pluralisme. Although it would be necessary for Colombetti to clarify her view’s position on the objectivity or subjectivity of the object of inquiry for her science of emotion. I elaborate on this point a bit more in my reply below regarding semantic dualism as an embodied cognitive theory. Regardless, given the arguments in my book (Mun 2021), I would advise Colombetti to accept that there is a fundamental objectivity to what emotions are even if her account promotes its subjective aspects. Semantic dualism equally accepts the subjective nature of emotional experiences (similar to other embodied cognitive accounts), but it also accepts that emotions can, at the least, be said to be ultimately independent of human conceptualizations (in terms of the history of its evolution and function); even though human conceptualizations may influence the particular way (or mode) in which an emotional experience unfolds.
If some views cannot be unified, this would also not pose a problem with meta-semantic pluralisme, since some theories may be more false than true, and meta-semantic pluralisme does not deny that some theories will be incommensurable. It does suggest, however, that all true theories are commensurable, at least in principle. Yet, even in the wake of acknowledged differences, semantic dualisme, especially as an aspect of meta-semantic pluralisme, can continue to contribute to the progress of an interdisciplinary science of emotion by suggesting how points of disagreement between theories of emotion can be identified. The project of unification would be impossible without the ability to do so.
I also want to discuss to some extent how I understand reductive-realism, type-identity theory, weak emergentism, and embodied cognition, especially to help resolve any confusions about whether a reductive realism, type-identity theory, and weak emergentism (rather than strong emergentism) threatens my view being an embodied cognitive view.
First, reductive-realism—within the context of the mind—is the view that mental phenomena can be “reduced” in terms of an identity relation with physical brain phenomena (and the same can be said mutatis mutandis for emotion). As Maiese observed, I take the identity relation to be constitutive and definitional, yet this does not mean that I propose that the language of mental phenomena and the language of physical phenomena are reducible. In fact, I deny that they are (at least completely). Furthermore, I believe that some words—specifically a term along with its referential meaning—of certain kinds of phenomena (e.g., “emotion,” “anger," “joy,” “intentionality,” “rationality,” and “knowledge”) can be applied across explanatory domains. I refer to these as “bridge terms,” and it is possible for a theoretical term to be a bridge term while also suffering from reference failure, especially if James A. Russell’s (2003; 2009) psychological constructionist theory turns out to be true. In such cases, these bridge principles may simply be empty terms or worlds.
I also don’t believe that—for the science of emotion—linguistic decisions have any significant ontological implications. Language, according to meta-semantic pluralisme does not determine whether an experience is an emotion or an emotion of some kind, although it might determine what we call the experience (e.g., “emotion”
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versus “affect”). Even in the light of Barrett’s (2017) conceptual act theory, meta-semantic pluralisme would suggest that there is an objective fact with respect to whether emotion concepts are necessarily essential aspects of an emotional experience. The fact that our emotional experiences have subjective aspects—for example, that according to Barrett an emotion concept is required for an emotional experience—does not necessarily entail that what emotions are is a subjective matter, or that there are no natural laws of emotion. An object of inquiry can be a subjective kind, and this would be an objective fact if it were true. This is a consequence of the α-ωe principle, and as I mentioned earlier, it is this principle that helps demarcate the science of emotion as a science rather than any other kind of endeavor.
In other words, whether or not we believe or say that an emotion is an objective kind or a subjective kind does not make a difference as to whether or not emotions are objective kinds or subjective kinds. Doxastic and linguistic decisions do often have conceptual and theoretical implications on one’s ontological world-view, which may then affect the way in which one makes sense of the world, the meaning one places on aspects of the world, and one’s behavior. Doxastic and linguistic decisions may also affect the particular way or mode in which a subject’s particular emotional experience might unfold. But these influences would not define that particular type of emotional experience as the type it is. They might, however, help to elaborate on the experience, making it richer, or to outline the boundaries of the type of emotional experience that the particular emotional experience is.
This leads to a discussion of Mendonça’s misinterpretation of the way I understand the relationship between English emotion words and emotion words in other languages, and I will admit that I may be partially at fault because of the difficulty I had in finding the words that would best express my intentions in a concise way. I believe that the meaning of English emotion words are heterogenous, especially if we consider both their senses and their referents, and the same can be said for emotion words in any other language. Furthermore, I also believe that the heterogeneity of emotion words, including in any particular ordinary language, does not preclude cross-cultural similarities between, at the least, the referents of emotion words from a variety of languages. In other words, it is possible for people from different languages and cultures to achieve a mutual understanding of the same emotional experience. Cross-cultural, emotional communication is possible. And simply because a language does not have a word for a specific type of emotion does not preclude speakers of that language from understanding, learning, or developing new emotion words. Furthermore, this conclusion is ultimately rooted in my commitment to the alpha-omega principle of interdisciplinary inquiry (α-ωe): that any object of inquiry can be understood from various perspectives, which may each yield a distinct view, theory, or language, and the truths of each perspective are ultimately united by a shared object of inquiry.
As noted, meta-semantic pluralisme is pluralistic about the legitimacy of world-views (to a certain extent). My two edited collections, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Shame (2019) and Cultural Perspectives on Shame (2023), address concerns about cultural differences for the interdisciplinary science of emotion, and especially the science of shame. Yet, I doubt that any world view can be said to be absolutely true, holistically speaking. What makes the framework I propose for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion an objectivist framework rather than an anti-objectivist framework—at the level of a framework for a philosophy of science—is that it presupposes that (at the least) aspects of a multitude of perspectives can be simultaneously made true by a shared, mind-independent object of inquiry. It is, therefore, the object of inquiry that not only unites multiple perspectives, but it is also what ultimately gives us knowledge by conferring truth or veridicality. Furthermore, friends and foes (allies and opponents) can be sought as one traces the overlaps and lack thereof between various theories, using the framework of meta-semantic pluralisme and the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion, with the hope of further clarifying, correcting, and eventually unifying theories of emotion, and adjudicating between adequate and inadequate theories.
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This does not mean that everything about a particular perspective is true or veridical. It is the cross-checking of perspectives (an individual’s, a theory’s, a discipline’s) that allows us to make corrections in our own views. In this sense, knowledge is always a communal effort. For example, if I am viewing a particular kind of four sided object, and the sides visible to me are all red, but someone else sees that the sides not visible to me are all green, then they would be able to check my claim that the object is red by sharing my perspective. To my surprise, they may say from their perspective, well no, the object is green. Given this inconsistency, I may move to where they are in order to take their perspective, and now I can say, “Well, I was partially right.” And, if a red/green colorblind person came along, and they reported that from either perspective, they see the same color, then perhaps that would lead us to wonder about how different people can see things differently without the difference being attributed to the object, and so the pursuit of knowledge continues!
Some might also wonder if some aspects of these differing perspectives can be “incommensurable,” yet still be true or veridical? I would say, if by “incommensurabile” one means that some of the aspects of opposing perspectives cannot be simultaneously true (e.g., consider a case where the perspective that an object is green from a particular perspective and the perspective that an object is red from that same perspective are in contradiction, and so incommensurable), then my answer is that I do not believe that the two opposing, incommensurable theories can be true, at least locally, at the point of opposition; but they may be commensurable at many other points. For example, Nussbaum and Prinz’s theories do not disagree on all aspects of emotion. It is a fact that the object of inquiry has certain properties, certain objectively real properties that are independent of human conceptualizations, as well as perceptions. These properties are perceived by some to have a certain kind of experiential quality (e.g., positive valence) and by others to have only another kind of experiential quality (e.g., negative valence), but the object, including the physical properties of the object, are still the same, and it will be the case that, given reductive-realism, the difference in the experiences would be found in the differences of the material composition or activity of the subject rather than the object. Again, this is one of the subjective aspects of meta-semantic pluralisme and a consequence of the α-ωe principle. Such a conclusion, however, does not lead to skepticism. Consider the case of perception I gave above: all three perceivers have knowledge of some aspect of the objective object of inquiry. It is simply the fact that each knows the object of inquiry in their own way (or mode), and that some of the ways that two of the perceivers know the object of inquiry can be given a similar kind of explanation (e.g., they know through “normal” vision, etc.) compared to how the red/green color blind person knows (e.g., they know through “red/green color/blind” vision, etc.).
EMBODIED COGNITION AND ENACTIVISM
With regard to what Maiese refers to as my “neurocentrism,” I don’t believe that holding a reductive realist, type-identity theory necessarily rejects the import of the body that is other than the brain, especially in the science of emotion. Perhaps some theories might do so, but meta-semantic pluralisme, semantic dualism, and semantic dualisme are not one of them. I also can’t say I know any emotion theories that do, especially if we consider theories of emotion from a meta-semantic pluralistic perspective. My focus on the brain is more so a matter of practical efficiency and preference.
With respect to the “ontological integration” inquired by Maiese, it seems that Maiese is again calling into question my “neurocentrism.” In elaborating on their comment, Maiese notes that, “embodied cognitive theories of emotion, as [they] understand them, aim to account for the ontological integration of emotion’s evaluative/cognitive dimension and its bodily dimension” (Maiese 2023, 16; this issue). On this we can agree. I have done so throughout chapters 4-9 (Mun 2021), at the level of fundamental foundations. That is how dense the discussion is that I give on this topic.
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This brings us to Maiese’s concern as to why my account is not an enactivist account, such as Giovanna Colombetti’s (2014). Maiese notes the various similarities that my account has with Colombetti’s, as well as the differences (my reductive realism, type-identity theory, and weak emergentism).
First, if an enactivist account—or Colombetti’s version—entails the rejection of reductive realism, type-identity theory, and weak emergence, then my account is not an enactivist account by this definition. It is also primarily because of my reductive realism that I am a type-identity theorist and not a strong emergentist. I believe strong emergence is, at the least, logically inconsistent with reductive realism. As far as I am aware, strong emergent theories differ from weak emergent theories in the sense that strong emergent theories hold that what is emergent cannot be predicted (prediction is impossible) rather than holding that at some emergent properties are not predictable. Weak emergence suggests that, although what emerges might be novel, it is nevertheless predictable. Furthermore, I want to suggest that I believe taking a powers approach to causation—perhaps like the one advocated by Nancy Cartwright (2019)—might help emotion theorists make some more headway in thinking about emergence and emotions. I will hold back for future work to further elaborate on this. In any case, I think a strong emergent view ultimately stands in the way of scientific pursuits. Colombetti proposes a dynamical systems approach, and her strong emergence—if she does in fact hold a strong emergent view, which I don’t think it is clear that she does—seems to be a feature of her dynamical systems approach. Yet, a dynamical systems framework need not entail strong emergence, and again, we might be able to make sense of this claim by unifying a dynamical systems approach with a mechanistic powers approach, as I suggested. This might also be a way to unite Colombetti’s dynamical systems approach with semantic dualisme.
Another reason why semantic dualism is not an enactivist theory, perhaps like Colombetti’s, is because enactivism, as far as I am aware, rejects representationalism. According to Evan Thompson (2017):
In The Embodied Mind, we presented the idea of cognition as enaction as an alternative to the view of cognition as representation. By “representation” we meant a structure inside the cognitive system that has meaning by virtue of its corresponding to objects, properties, or states of affairs in the outside world, independent of the system. By “enaction” we meant the ongoing process of being structurally and dynamically coupled to the environment through sensorimotor activity. Enaction brings forth an agent-dependent world of relevance rather than representing an agent-independent world. We called the investigation of cognition as enaction the “enactive approach.”
I agree that representationalism has a problematic history, perhaps especially because of the influences of sense-datum theories, but representationalism need not necessarily be explicated in terms of such interpretations. One might in fact trace the roots of representationalism to as far back as Aristotle, especially if propositional content requires representational content (Sorbaji [1992] 1996). The point is that I do not deny the usefulness of talk of representations. And if the phrase “independent of the system” in the above passage refers to the objects that are represented, which are independent of a subject as a system, then I would gladly admit that semantic dualism is not an enactivist account. Yet, I agree with the enactivist that experiences are products of a living being’s activity or interaction with its environment, including other living beings, and that “an agent brings forth an agent dependent world of relevance,” although I deny that this precludes the “agent representing an agent-independent world.” In other words, representationalism is not necessarily inconsistent or in contradiction with the idea that an agent is always involved in an “ongoing process of being structurally and dynamically coupled to the environment through sensorimotor activity.” Being “coupled” in such a way can in fact be the way in which at least some representations are implemented in a system. So, I question the mutually exclusive disjunction between aspects of representationalism and enactivism that Thompson seems to be suggesting in the above passage, and I believe this is possible because both enactive and semantic dualist theories are embodied cognitive theories.
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While Maiese observed the virtues of Colombetti’s dynamical systems approach, she noted that “by emphasizing the interdependence between bodily and cognitive dimensions of emotion, Colombetti’s account undermines the notion that bodily feelings lack any sort of representational content” (Mun 2021, 15; this issue). Yet, this interpretation seems incorrect. Consider, for example, Colombetti’s criticism of Jesse Prinz’s (2004) embodied, non-cognitive view:
This representational framework goes together, in Prinz, with the view that things like danger, loss, offense, and so on, are objective properties that exist independently from their being represented by the organism. Prinz (2004b, 63) acknowledges (somewhat in passing) that core relational themes refer to “relational” properties or “organism-environment relations,” but he then goes on to argue that they are not “response-dependent.” So, for instance, something such as the death of my favorite pet turtle “would be a loss even if I didn’t represent it as a loss. It is a loss before I make the discovery that my turtle is dead” (63). (Colombetti 2014, 110)
Colombetti then contrasts her view from Prinz’s objectivist view, in the following way:
From an enactive perspective, on the other hand, danger, loss, and other core relational themes (offense, existential threat, progress toward the realization of a goal, and so on; see Lazarus 2001) are not represented or detected but enacted, namely, brought forth in the world-organism encounter—in other words, they are response dependent. (Colombetti 2014, 110)
There is a question as to whether Colombetti’s view is a representational view, as suggested by Maiese, especially given my earlier comments about the false dichotomy that Thompson draws between representationalism and enactivism, the logic of which Colombetti seems to be relying on in these passages, and also in light of Colombetti’s footnote (Colombetti 2014, fn. 16, 216-217). I will leave this for Colombetti, Maiese, myself, or any one else interested in finding out to clarify.
Regardless, semantic dualism proposes that representational content must be a posit that is made by a theory’s ontology. As a short summary, as I understand emotions, the greater genus “emotion” is characterized by the kind of intentionality that is generally involved in all kinds of emotional experiences: a relation between aspects of the world and a subject’s well-being. The intentionality of emotions is what confers upon them their representational nature. Not surprisingly, it is also this commitment to the intentionality of emotions as a defining feature of what emotions are, which also differentiates my view from accounts like Colombetti’s. Earlier I noted that there was an ambiguity with Colombetti’s view, specifically with respect to the dynamical system view’s ontological commitments. Here, I point out that the ambiguity with the ontological commitments of Colombetti’s account might also be connected to the ambiguity in its commitment to representationalism and the intentionality of emotion.
In summarizing this section, I believe the most important take home point is to highlight the need for clarification and precision when speaking of embodied cognitive theories. This seems to be a recurring problem in the discourse on embodied cognition (e.g., refer to Clark 2008). The principles of embodied cognition are distinct from the principles of enactivism, and although both can be held together they need not be. Furthermore, as my comments above demonstrate, it seems that some additional clarity on the relationship between enactivism and representationalism is also warranted. Finally, it would be wise for interlocutors in the discourse on the mind and emotion to not equivocate these two notions, or to attempt to drive a wedge between notions in which a wedge is not warranted by the principle in question.
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META-EMOTIONS
In response to Mendonça, I want to first thank Mendonça for their thoughtful comments, and I appreciate their suggestions as to how I might further elaborate on my views. In response to their suggestion that I should further elaborate on the role of emotion regulation in understanding the rationality of our emotions, I agree. As Mendonça observed, I offer a sketch of the variety of ways in which emotion regulation—both conscious and unconscious—can work, and connecting these concerns with concerns about the rationality of emotions would be beneficial. I provide the foundations for doing so in chapters 6-10, wherein I discuss some of the evaluative aspects of emotion. Mendonça also appreciates my suggestion that the rationality of emotions can be understood in three different ways—in terms of ontological rationality, evaluative rationality, and epistemic rationality—and they suggest that I consider the more social nature of the rationality of emotions. I agree that elaborating on the social aspects of the rationality of emotions would be a good thing to do, and I want to note that the foundations for doing so have been laid, not only in providing a theory of intentionality, but also a theory of three ways in which one can understand the rationality of emotions. The focus of my current research is in fact on political emotions, and I will for the time being point the reader to my work on shame and epistemic injustice, which can give the reader some additional insight into the social nature of emotional rationality (Mun 2019, ch. 3, “Oppression and Liberation via the Rationalities of Shame”).
With respect to Mendonça’s suggestion that I take on Scott A. Howard’s (2017) challenge of making sense of meta-emotions, I think this is a great idea. I love a good challenge! Furthermore, although Mendonça has referred to the limited way in which I have addressed meta-emotions in my book, I believe it is important to call attention to the fact that what I offered in my book are interdisciplinary foundations for a science of emotion rather than a full-fledged account of what emotions are; yet the inclusion of meta-emotions in my sketch of a semantic-dualist theory of emotion (Mun 2021, chapter 10) demonstrates my forethought for the direction in which my research is headed. And rather than elaborating on how meta-emotions might be related to the third kind of language of emotion—the language of emotion at the meta-semantic level—my foresighted intention was to address meta-emotions as being something other than a first- or second-order emotion while also playing a crucial role in explaining what emotions are. I appreciate Mendonça’s suggestions, and I agree that it would be interesting to pursue those avenues of research. I hope to do so at a future time, and I welcome others to do so as well.[1] In this reply, I will give readers an idea of where I am headed with my notion of “meta-emotions,” and in doing so, I hope I have sufficiently responded to Mendonça’s concerns and questions about meta-emotions.
First, it is important to note that “meta-emotions” are typically understood as emotions that are about other emotions (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven 1997; Ferrari and Koyama 2002; Jäger and Bartsch 2006; Mendonça 2013; Howard 2017; Belli and Broncano 2017). Meta-emotions are, therefore, regarded to be a kind of meta-cognitive experience, and one of the key defining features of meta-emotions as meta-cognitions is that they are a kind of reflexive awareness of the emotional experience that is their object. Meta-emotions, therefore, are thought to necessarily have propositional content of which the subject is consciously aware. For example, Gottman et. al noted that their concept of a meta-emotion “paralleled the area of meta-cognition, which referred to the executive function of cognitions” (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven 1997, 6). They elaborated on this notion by noting that, within the context of their investigations on parent-child interactions, what they meant by “the meta-emotion structure construct, specifically, is the parent’s awareness of specific emotions, their awareness of these emotions in their child, and their coaching of the emotion in their child” (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven 1997, 6). To this extent, one might conceive meta-emotions as kinds of propositional attitudes. Meta-emotions so understood, what I refer to as “second-order emotions,” are emotions that are about other emotional experiences, whereas my conception of “meta-emotions” are not emotions nor are they second-order emotions.
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To further elaborate on my conception of meta-emotions, and why I believe it is important to distinguish them from both first- and second-order emotions, I offer the following considerations about bell hooks’ notion of love ([2000] 2001, 2001, 2002, 2004). Before doing so, however, I want to first acknowledge and applaud the significant contributions bell hooks has made toward a feminist conception of love. It cannot be denied that her vision of love has been inspirational. The kind of love hooks conceived is one in which the lover and the beloved can stand before each other—as I and thou (Buber [1923] 1937)—as each in their self, out of mutual care and concern for each other’s flourishing. It is one that is absent of narcissistic control and any form of domination or violence. It is the kind of love hooks takes to be spiritual, divine—or sharing of it—and, perhaps above all, it is thought to be a healthy kind of love. Such a love—or even simply a vision of the possibility of such a love—makes one hopeful for the future, and I truly believe that such a conception of love is necessary for humanity’s flourishing for at least this reason. Such a conception of love also provides us with a realistic ideal of love to strive toward. It is an ideal kind of love that is humanly achievable.
Yet, in its beauty and its virtuousness it stands as an ideal that marginalizes all other relationships that might in fact be loving relationships as loveless relationships. Consider, for example, the relationship that hooks reports between herself and her father. In All About Love, we learn that hooks’ father was abusive, and in The Will to Change (hooks 2004), we not only learn more details about the kind of abuse she, her siblings, and her mother endured, but also that such behavior was a consequence of her father’s patriarchy. We also learn that although she and her siblings later enjoyed a healthy loving relationship with their father as adults, she did not regard the relationship that she had with her father as a child to be one of love. For, given hooks’ conception of love—one that cannot co-exist with narcissistic control, abuse, domination, or violence—the patriarchy embodied by people like her father renders the subject of patriarchy incapable of love. The idealistic conception of love as a virtue offered by hooks, therefore, renders patriarchal individuals like her father not as people who did not know how to love well, but instead as one whose ability to love has been disabled by patriarchy. In short, according to hooks’ conception of love, patriarchy renders those who are the subjects of patriarchal love incapable of loving, and those who are its objects as those who are unloved.
Perhaps some might not find this first problem to be of any concern. You may be willing to quite readily deny that the childhood relationship hooks had with her father was one of love. To be clear, I am not arguing for the claim that any act of narcissistic control, domination, abuse, or violence can be an act of love. Harvey Weinstein did not rape his victims out of love. The victims of Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell’s sex-trafficking were not victims of love.[2] And I surely do not want to suggest that hooks’ experience of her childhood relationship with her father was a relationship of love if she did not believe it was. And I hope that my alternative account of love is able to make sense of these experiences, or to provide a conceptual space to make sense of them, in relation to our understanding of love. My concern, however, is less for what a third-party observer might be willing to accept or deny, and more so for what someone like hooks’ father would be willing to accept or deny.
More specifically, my concern is with our attempts to understand the perspectives of all the parties involved: to seek the justice in love for someone like hooks’ father (and perhaps in doing so, for my own father and mother). I wonder, would hooks’ father (or mother) be willing to accept that his relationship with his daughter, when she was a child, was not one of love? Ought we care about how he might have felt, thought, or believed about his relationship with his daughter? At this point, I cannot help but think back to Ban Zhao’s (n.d.) letters to her daughters to wonder how many young, liberated, feminist women of today would interpret Zhao as a feminist leaving words of wisdom for her daughters out of love. Or consider Amy Chau’s (2011) love for her daughters: the love of a tiger mom. Would Chau or her daughters deny that Chau’s attempts to motivate, educate, and prepare her daughters for what Chau believed to be a life of success in this world of racism, sexism, and elitism were acts of love?
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Second, granting that acts like those committed by Weinstein, Epstein, and Maxwell, were not acts of love—and can be clearly differentiated from those acts committed by hooks’ father, Chau, and Zhao, what I will call acts of “patriarchal love”—I argue that what differentiates patriarchal love from the kind of ideal feminist love described by hooks is the conception of the good for the beloved that is had by the lover rather than a difference of there not being versus being love. Furthermore, in so far as arriving at what one might call a “true,” “healthy,” “flourishing” conception of what is good for anyone, let alone a beloved, involves knowledge and wisdom—not simply for oneself, but also for one’s beloved—hooks’ ideal feminist love is a kind of love which many may not be capable. Accordingly, hooks’ ideal feminist love leaves us with a world with far less love than many might have believed existed compared to a world that allows for love to be flawed.
What psychologists have referred to as attachment theory provides a significant framework for much of what hooks ([2000] 2001) says about love. As hooks notes, “We learn about love in childhood. Whether our homes are happy or troubled, our families functional or dysfunctional, it’s the original school of love” (17). This passage embodies the general principle at the core of a theory of love as an attachment: that our conceptions of love are rooted in our experiences between ourselves and our caretakers. For example, Phillip R. Shaver, Cindy Hazan, and Donna Bradshaw (2021) provide a theory of romantic love that is structured analogously with the characteristics and dynamics of different mother-infant attachment styles. According to Shaver et al., given that mother-infant relationships can be characterized in three different ways (secure, anxious/ambivalent, and avoidant), one might similarly differentiate three distinct styles of romantic love: secure, anxious/ambivalent, and avoidant.
More specifically, a secure kind of love can be characterized consistently with the kind of ideal feminist love conceived by hooks: “Secure lovers described love as especially happy, friendly, and trusting, and emphasized being able to accept and support their partner despite the partner’s faults” (80). Yet, unlike hooks’ depiction of “genuine love,” Shaver et al. also acknowledge a kind of love in which the “lovers were characterized by fear of intimacy, emotional highs and lows, and jealousy,” what they referred to as “avoidant lovers,” and those who experienced love as “involving obsession, desire for reciprocation and union, emotional highs and lows, and extreme sexual attraction and jealousy,” whom they referred to as “anxious/ambivalent” lovers (80). Furthermore, one might easily infer that these last two kinds of romantic lovers are the kinds whom hooks’ ideal feminist conceptions of love would render not only as being loveless, but also as incapable of loving.
But why does hooks’ conception of love lead to the potential denial that there can be anxious/ambivalent, avoidant, or simply bad lovers given that it is indeed modeled (to a certain extent) in accordance with an attachment theory of love? What keeps hooks’ conception of love from fully recognizing the myriad of different kinds of love—both good and bad—of which humanity may be capable? I argue that what hinders hooks’ ideal feminist conception of love is not simply the idea that love and patriarchy—narcissistic control, dominance, abuse, and violence—cannot coexist, but rather a conception of love as an emotion. As an emotion, love is often thought to be a kind of propositional attitude or psychological state that one has toward the object of the emotion (the object of love). Thus, for hooks, love cannot rationally coexist with patriarchy, nor with any of these other contradicting negative attitudes.
Patriarchy, however, is still the dominant ideology, not only in the United States, but also globally.[4] To this extent, it seems that the world is not only practically loveless, but also incapable of love, on a global scale, given hooks’ ideal feminist conception of love. Consider Heidi Keller’s (2018) point that the kind of attachment theory that regards a secure attachment style to be the ideal for child rearing (or relationships of care or love) predominantly reflects the values of Western middle-class families, and can harm the families of non-Western, traditional, subsistence-based farming communities when used to make judgments about these families, including for the purpose of making welfare decisions for their children. And as Keller notes, “Traditionally
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living farmers in non-Western countries represent about 30-40% of the world’s population and the great majority of migrants in Western countries” (11415). Granting that the kinds of attachments engendered within these cultures are not of the ideal of a Western, middle-class notion of a secure attachment, hooks’ notion of love renders the relationships of the members of the families of these kinds of cultures as not only loveless relationships, but ones that are also not capable of love. Such conclusions strike me as not only false, but also unjust.
As a child of patriarchal parents who were raised in a traditional, Confucian culture, I deny that the relationship between myself and my parents is loveless, and I deny that my relationship between my parents and myself, throughout my childhood and into my adult years, were not of love. But if patriarchy—narcissistic control, dominance, abuse, or violence—cannot coexist with love, then how is one to make sense of the love that I know I shared with my parents, and that I still share with my mother (who has made some considerable feminist strides with her conception of love since my father’s passing)? Note that a conception of love as a second-order emotion also does not resolve this problem, although it may give us important insights into experiences of malpracticed love.
My solution is to suggest that when we speak of “love” we are often referring to a “meta-emotion.” As I understand “meta-emotions,” they are first-order experiences (i.e., are directly felt and do not require any concepts in order to experience them)—and in this way they are similar to first-order emotional experiences—but they are not emotions since they do not inform us about how aspects of the world relate to our well-being. In other words, they serve a different function compared to emotions (i.e., they take up a different structural, causal space in our emotional experiences). What I refer to as “meta-emotions”—such as what I refer to as “love”—help structure our emotional experiences so as to be about aspects of the world that relate to our well-being. Yet, rather than serving the kind of functions that are served by emotions, they are kinds of bonds that relate an individual to the object of the meta-emotion, and thereby establish the value of significance upon their objects, and allow such objects to become aspects of emotional experiences. Belli and Broncano’s (2017) account of trust as a meta-emotion is consistent with my understanding of meta-emotions as relations, yet one ought to observe the difference between the sense of a “meta-emotion” that I, and Belli and Broncano, use in this context and the more typical way in which “meta-emotions” are understood (as second-order emotions).
I hope the foregoing demonstrates to a sufficient degree how the notion of “meta-emotions” that I introduced in my book differs from the typical understanding of what meta-emotions are within the discourse on meta-emotions, along with what such a notion of meta-emotions can do in helping us better understand ourselves, others, and how we may relate to each other through love, while also granting that the kind of love hooks promotes is, perhaps, the healthiest or most ideal kind of loving relationship that one can achieve. Yet, it should be clear that my notion of meta-emotions is not wholly unrelated to the typical notions used within the discourse on meta-emotions. What they all have in common is the hierarchical structuring of experiences in which one kind of emotional experience is embedded in another, and where an explanation of each of the structurally related emotional experiences requires an explanation of the other(s). Meta-emotions, as I understand them—as pre-emotions—do not entail a conscious, propositional, awareness of the object of the emotion, unlike meta-emotions understood as kinds of propositional attitudes. One significant contribution that this notion of meta-emotions, so understood, can make is to help explain how love can co-exist with patriarchy, and thereby provide some space for wider, more inclusive conversations about love. And, if I have not sufficiently done so, I hope to be able to make up for it in a forthcoming paper.
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REFLEXIVITY
Mendonça also raises several concerns regarding the notion of reflexivity that I used in elucidating meta-semantic pluralisme. As Mendonça observed, “Even though the third layer described by Mun, which is constituted by the meta-theoretical language of emotion, indicates various degrees of reflexivity of the emotional landscape, the book fails to fully explain in detail how the third level, ‘constitutes the most reflective form of a language of emotion compared to the first two’ (Mun 2021, 162)” (Mendonça 2023, 20; this issue). More pointedly, Mendonça calls attention to my explanation that because I already provided an example of a meta-theoretical language of emotion in chapters 2 and 3, “I will not further discuss this third kind of language of emotion in this chapter” (Mun 2021, 162-3). Mendonça also mentions some ways in which the reflexivity of emotions, including meta-emotions, “can be theoretically explored with the third language of emotion proposed by [me]” (Mendonça 2023, 21; in this issue).
First, I want to clarify that what is at issue here are concerns about what I refer to as a meta-language of emotion. I am proposing a meta-language throughout the book. The meta-language is the language of meta-semantic pluralisme. The meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion can be understood as introducing some of the logic and ontology of such a meta-language. Such a language is the most reflexive to the extent that the meta perspective of this language entails an understanding of both a second-order language of emotion (e.g., theories of emotion or folk emotion languages) and a first-order language of emotion (e.g., experiences of emotion). Furthermore, as the perspective moves from a first-order to a second-order, and then to a third (meta) order, one additional kind of reflexivity can be said to be added at each upper level: for a first-order language the reflexivity involves the sensory, psycho-bio-physical feedback loop between one’s self and one’s environment[3]; for a second-order language the reflexivity involves theorizing about experiences of emotion (i.e., first-order languages of emotion are the objects of a second-order language of emotion, and second-order languages of emotion are theories of emotion); and a third meta-language involves theorizing about theories of emotion. Each effective perspective in theorizing can also be said to entail a distinct perspective. So, the meta language of meta-semantic pluralisme involves at least three perspectives of reflexivity, which can be understood as the following kinds of awareness: bodily awareness (first-order language), conceptual awareness (second-order language), epistemic awareness (meta-language).
Second, the Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion spends a significant amount of pages (more than two chapters, but especially chapters 2 and 3, explicating the language of meta-semantic pluralisme). So, I believe my response that readers review chapters 2 and 3 as a more detailed discussion about a meta-language, including its reflexivity, is still well warranted. Throughout these chapters, I explain the basic elements from which the language of meta-semantic pluralisme (i.e., the categories of the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion) were constructed, including the difference between giving a semantic analysis, a meta-semantic analysis, and the kinds of reflexivity involved. I also presented a very brief summary of the difference between semantic and meta-semantic analyses in my précis, and I hope this sufficiently addresses Mendonça’s concerns and suggestions.
Mendonça further notes that, “a more direct link between the meta-theoretical language, which is about the already available theories of emotion, and the changes it brings to the first-order theoretical body of language, would have been important for the reader. My response is that, although I agree, I believe the question as to whether or not a meta-language significantly influences a first-order language of emotion (the language of emotional experiences) is still under investigation and I hope to make future contributions regarding concerns such as these. For now, I will refer the reader to my paper on shame and epistemic injustice (Mun 2019, chapter 3), which should help illustrate the value of taking a meta-semantic pluralistice approach to understanding shame, including its liberatory effects at the level of their first-order language of emotion.
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I’d like to conclude by thanking both my commentators, as well as the editor and referees who helped bring this book symposium to fruition. It is my honor to be able to engage in such a great scholarly discussion of my work, and I hope that many other authors will have the opportunity to do so with their own books through the resources provided by the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion. I also hope that the discussions presented here will help inspire some of you in your research and future publications.
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Notes
[1] If anyone decides to write on a topic that is relevant to or inspired by this book symposium and you believe I would make a good referee for your paper, please make sure to cite my work. Because of the problems with bias in citing minority and underrepresented scholars, I now only review papers for journals that cite my work, at least once. So, if you think I could possibly be a referee for any of your papers, you should cite my work in those papers so as to increase the possibility of me refereeing it. I would also advise others to use this strategy so as to help correct some of the current problems that minority and underrepresented authors face in academic publishing.
[2] One way to draw a distinction between these acts and acts of love that involve patriarchy, which hooks defines as entailing narcissistic control, dominance, abuse, and violence, is that with patriarchal love the lover acts with the belief that they are contributing to their beloved's ultimate well-being.
[3] As indicated by the United Nation Development Programme’s Gender Inequality Index (GII). https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII.
[4] For an interesting account of a fundamental feedback loop of this kind, refer to Cochrane’s (2018) account of valent representations.
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Cecilea Mun © 2023
Author email: cecileamun[at]icloud.com
