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Commentary
Master Narratives: Ideology Embedded and Embodied
Alan Jurgens
University of Wollongong, AU
Jurgens, Alan. 2024. ”Master Narratives: Embodying Ideology.”
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 6, no. 1: 20-28. https://doi.org/10.33497/2024.summer.3.
Abstract: While I agree with most of Maiese and Hanna’s (2019) claims in The Mind-Body Politic, I argue that it is possible to offer a fuller explanation of the effects of ideologies and how they are implemented by adopting a narrative analysis to examine the role that narratives play in shaping the social and material conditions of institutions, and individuals’ cognitive habits and affective frames. A narrative analysis maintains that much of our perceptions of and experiences in the world are shaped by the synthesis of conceptual and affective knowledge that we encounter in socio-cultural narratives. Socio-cultural narratives are understood here as narratives that establish, shape, and reinforce cultural beliefs and practices or societal social structures, process, and organizations. By utilizing a narrative analysis we can then employ an additional methodology to examine and understand how we, as individuals, develop and change our particular embodied habits and affective framing patterns. I show how this can be done by focusing on, and expanding upon, Maiese and Hanna’s discussion of neoliberalism and the backfire effect, where individuals resist changes to their affective framing patterns and habitual ways of being in the world.
Keywords: ideology, narratives, habit, enaction, social philosophy
There is a lot to admire in Maiese and Hanna’s (2019) The Mind-Body Politic in its examination of the effects social institutions have on individuals’ cognition and well-being. By combining the enactive approach from philosophy of mind with political and social theory, their analysis provides new insights on how institutions and social practices shape minds for better or worse. At the center of their analysis is the mind shaping thesis that the socio-dynamic patterns of embodied minds are saliently constrained by social institutions that fundamentally affect our lives, generally without self-conscious awareness. Following Bourdieu (1977), they claim that socio-material institutions, in relationship to our particular forms of embodiment, partly determine our formation of cognition and action in terms of habits and affective framing patterns, which produce specific bodily know-how and ways of being in the world. According to Maiese and Hanna, such “habits of mind encompass schemas for interacting and engaging with one’s environment” (2019, 46, emphasis in the original), and the schemas that one adopts will determine what features of people and event they will attend to, what they ascribe value towards, and what views or beliefs they’ll find acceptable. In the book, the authors specifically
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examine the effects of the neoliberal university and healthcare institutions as case-studies for how institutions can have detrimental and deforming effects on individuals.
This focus on neoliberalism is essential as they rightly claim that neoliberalism “has become part of the contemporary world’s ‘common sense’ and is now regarded by the vast majority of people in democratic and non-democratic societies alike to be the most ‘natural’ way of viewing the world and human existence” (Maiese and Hanna 2019, 27, emphases in the original). Borrowing Mark Fisher’s notion of “capitalist realism,” they emphasize that a capitalist ideology is now so deeply entrenched in the culture and structure of many institutions in the world such that there is now a “widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative” (Fisher 2009, 2; cited in Maiese and Hanna 2019, 27, emphasis in the original). Essentially, I am in near complete agreement with this focus, their justification for it, and their analysis of how the neoliberal university and healthcare institutions deform and harm not only the well-being of individuals, but their cognitive capacities as well.
Nevertheless, in this commentary I argue that by expanding their analysis through adopting a narrative analysis to examine the role that narratives play in shaping the social and material conditions of institutions and individuals’ cognition, it is possible to offer a fuller explanation of the effects of ideology. This is because a narrative analysis is able to examine how our particular embodied habits and affective framing patterns—our schemas—change through our engagements with specific socio-cultural narratives. Socio-cultural narratives are narratives that establish, shape, and reinforce cultural beliefs and practices and societal social structures, process, and organizations. At the foundation of a narrative analysis is the assumption that narratives at their core do two things. First, they provide syntheses of conceptual and affective knowledge that present particular ways of perceiving and experiencing the world, i.e. narrative schemas. Second, narratives and narrative understanding underly the foundation of our capacity to understand others and ourselves and shape our ways of being in the world (Hutto 2008; Ruston 2017). Thus, through encountering and embracing new kinds of affective framing patterns and habits found within narratives, our own affective framing patterns and habits shift to align with these new ways of being in the world.
According to Bruner (1991) and Nelson (2003), narratives are discursive ways to make sense of events in terms of human intentions, affection, and motivation. Importantly, by working with this broad and minimal definition it’s possible to capture the wide variety of narratives found in every culture and society, whether they be fictional, historical, religious, or personal. The term master narrative was introduced by Lyotard (1979) as a critique of institutional and ideological forms of knowledge. Following Erikson (1959, 1968), master narratives provide a system of beliefs and ways of being in the world that says something about one’s social and political location. In this sense, as Hammack and Toolis (2015, 355) explain, one’s identity “is both process (it is made through social practice) and product (it is codified in the personal narrative that integrates the discourse of master narratives), but identities are always constructed from social and political locations.” Importantly, master narratives function in relation to ideologies as means for implementing and disseminating the beliefs, values and practices of an ideology. In doing so, master narratives not only explain, but also legitimate identities and knowledge by establishing and maintaining power relations, norms and habits. Additionally, as stated above, and as Jones and McBeth (2010, 330) have highlighted, there is substantial empirical evidence that suggests narratives are “a primary means by which individuals organize, process, and convey information,” and that they play a crucial role “in shaping beliefs and actions.”
In addition to the notion of a master narrative, I want to introduce here the notion of a local narrative. While we can understand neoliberalism as an ideology and the American Dream as a master narrative that disseminates this ideology, we can further distinguish local narratives that reflect the structure and contents of a master
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narrative in a particular local context. The most common example here is when an individual’s achievements are praised due to their hard work by either the local news or within an institution or organization’s newsletter. Typically this involves a narrative that mirrors the structure of the American Dream where the success is attributed primarily to the individual themselves, reinforcing the beliefs and values of a neoliberal ideology where one is primarily responsible for their own success and must pull themselves up by their bootstraps. Through encountering these kinds of local narratives— an individual’s own understanding of themselves and their place in the world—their personal narrative is in turn shaped in one way or another. Not only do local narratives influence individuals’ personal narratives, but they also shape their cognitive processes, affective framing patterns, habits, and, more generally, their experience and way of being in the world, i.e. their schemas. For example, a local narrative of a self-made business person would include detailing the individual’s beliefs and values, their motivational drive for success, and the kinds of habits and practices they employed to attain success. The details of this local narrative would involve presenting specific kinds of embodied and adaptive knowledge to succeed in a particular environment. Both, the reason for presenting this specific local narrative and the goal the narrative is meant to achieve, would be to inspire others ascribe to the values laid out in the narrative, and to adopt the cognitive processes, affective framing patterns and habits described in the narrative.
Having provided a brief exposition of narratives and narratives analysis, I want to continue following the integrative path laid out by Maiese and Hanna by drawing together insights from enactive philosophers of mind with work from social and political philosophy. I’ll next turn to an exposition of Maiese and Hanna’s (2019) discussion of habits, affective framing patterns, and the issue of the backfire effect. Their discussion of the backfire effect is particularly important as it encompasses an analysis of the phenomenon of individuals resisting changes to their beliefs, affective framing patterns, and habitual ways of being in the world. Then, I’ll show how it’s possible to shed more light on why individuals might be resistant to these kinds of change by applying a narrative analysis and drawing on narrativist work from social and political theory. I do this by arguing that it is possible to clarify why individuals experience the backfire effect, in the face of evidence that should give them reasons to reject the core beliefs of neoliberalism, through an understanding of neoliberalism as an ideology that is embedded in and disseminated through master narratives, such as the American Dream and local narratives.
HABITS, AFFECTIVE FRAMING PATTERNS, AND THE BACKFIRE EFFECT
Maiese and Hanna (2019, 269) argue that affective framing of objects, situations, or events are “the jumping-off points” for more sophisticated cognitive and practical processes. In chaper 7, they emphasize the importance of this position that “affective reframing plays a central, fundamental role in personal, moral, and political transformation,” which is made possible in one way via particular kinds of educational institutions (287, emphases in the original). Their position is that by developing constructive, enabling educational institutions it is possible to socially reverse engineer individuals who presumably have already accepted capitalist realism in order to “promote robust solidarity and emancipation from oppression, and cultivate flexible habits of mind” (287).
The authors focus most of their discussion here on how learning of others’ ways of being in the world, within a constructive, enabling educational institution, can lead to significant changes in the affective framing patterns and habits of an individual. In this regard, they say that:
[L]istening to and imaginatively exploring others’ perspectives and ways of life can affectively “move” students, disrupt their existing schemas, and radically change the way that they frame the topics under discussion. To see and hear and feel another person give voice to an alternative perspective is to have that point of view become something real, “in your face,” and subjectively potent (Maiese and Hanna 2019, 278, emphasis in the original).
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By directly encountering others’ emotional responses to their experiences of oppression, an individual’s own emotional response can help her realize previously unconsidered ways of experiencing and being in the world. This can then lead to a radical shift in her own affective framing patterns and habits, i.e., their schemas.
While I would not want to downplay the importance of engaging directly with others different from us in order to develop more flexible habits and affective frames, we can nevertheless also gain access to different perspectives through engagement with narratives. Maiese and Hanna do recognize this as there are a number of occasions in the last two chapters of the book in which the authors highlight the importance of narratives in this reforming process. For example, they appeal to Yorks and Kasl’s (2002, 187) claim that by “‘affording glimpses into the other’s world of experience’, expressive ways of knowing such story-telling, drawing, and dance can help learners to shift their perspective” (Maiese and Hanna 2019, 280-281). Similarly, drawing on Carden (2006) and Cody’s (2015) work, they claim that like dance, drama practice can also foster flexible mental habits by allowing individuals to “adopt the point of view of a character very different from themselves and to seriously consider alternative perspectives” (Maiese and Hanna 2019, 283). By not only imagining themselves as a different character in a different social role, but also through adopting the associated behavior, acting allows one to experience and experiment with a range of bodily habits and points of view. This kind of embodied narrative practice can provide the opportunity to “open up space for raising questions about power, identity, society, and big capitalism” (284). Yet, we may not always have opportunities to directly engage with others different from us, nor to engage in particular kinds of art.
Though, even when we can engage in these kinds of experiences, changing one’s habitual ways of engaging with the world is not easy. Maiese and Hanna (2019, 300) emphasize this point with their discussion of the backfire effect, which is when individuals faced with information or experiences that run counter to their standing beliefs and habits entrench themselves further into their position as opposed to embracing change. Citing a study by Nyhan and Reifler (2010), the authors explain how individuals presented with corrective information after reading political news articles systematically responded to the corrective information in accordance with their previously held ideological beliefs. Instead of changing their opinion on the political issue, often the participants responded in ways that maintained and entrenched their established beliefs.
Expanding on this issue, the authors claim that the backfire effect “shows that cognitive walls, especially those concerning persistent false beliefs, memories, stereotypical mental images, feelings, or emotions are self-reinforcing” (Maiese and Hanna 2019, 300, emphasis in the original). As the study showed, when trying to directly “confront a person’s cognitive walls with contrary correct facts, the higher and thicker he builds his walls, without even knowing what he is doing, and all the while fully convinced that he is in the right” (300). These cognitive walls that produce the backfire effect are said to be strongest in regard to an individual’s (1) sense of individual identity as a person, and (2) sense of group identity as a self-identified member of an important social community or institution.
The authors argue that cognitive walls can be understood as an individual “being stuck in certain affective frames that arise via her engagement with destructive, deforming social institutions” (301, emphasis in the original). In order to overcome one’s cognitive walls and limit the occurrence of the backfire effect, the authors claim that these walls “need to be critically and freely taken apart by the rational human agent herself, in a transformative process of essentially embodied critical self-education” (300, emphases in the original). They argue that this requires an individual to undergo a “cognitive-affective revolution,” which is comprised of significant changes in her affective framing patterns and habits (303). However, the authors claim that these kinds of changes are not easy to undertake, as “most people are desperately afraid of and deeply averse to doing this,” and as such, when having an experience that may develop more cognitive flexibility or change in one’s mental habits, instead a
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backfire effect can occur (303). Thus, they recognize that the backfire effect can occur when an individual encounters disruption to their customary ways of behaving, where there are “unusually high amounts of incoherence between their pre-existing understandings and the new ideas that they encounter” which leads to a retrenching and retreating into pre-existing ways of thinking (Concepción and Elfin 2009; cited in Maiese and Hanna 2019, 303-304).
Drawing on Mihai (2016) the authors (Maiese and Hanna 2019, 307-308) argue that in order to break down cognitive walls and avoid the backfire effect, “we must problematize the very categories through which the citizens see the world.” They claim this can occur through shifting one’s habits by not only having different kinds of bodily experiences, but also through engaging with storytelling and arts of all kinds. In this sense, by being exposed to (1) different kinds of artistic expression, such as dystopian narrative works of fiction, and (2) real-life experiences that relate the alternative perspectives and divergent life experiences of others, it’s possible to alter one’s habits and breakdown established cognitive walls. Nevertheless, while Maiese and Hanna discuss in a bit more detail how narratives can be used to overcome cognitive walls and the backfire effect, I argue that through employing a narrative analysis we can better understand why an individual may be averse to a particular cognitive-affective revolution, i.e., why a backfire effect might occur.
THE AMERICAN DREAM AS A MASTER NARRATIVE FOR NEOLIBERALISM
By expanding on the established work of enactivists (Hutto 2008; 2015; Jurgens 2022) on the role narratives play in the ontogenesis of social cognitive capacities and identity with the concept of a master narrative from social and political philosophy (Hammack and Toolis 2015; Ruston 2017), we can better understand how master, local, and personal narratives function to not only generate meaning, but also establish habits and affective framing patterns. This is because through identifying which master and local narratives a particular individual or social group ascribe to, we can better understand their ideological commitments and their underlying reasons for having particular socio-cultural norms and values. Thus, by utilizing a narrative analysis we can better understand not only how detrimental habits, affective frames, and cognitive walls develop, but also how we may be resistant to change or have our cognitive walls broken-down.
Essentially, narratives illuminate “which events are significant and why” for individuals within particular social groups (Roth 1991, 178), and do so by selectively focusing on “the elements that are relevant to our interests, and to the interests of our audience” (Goldie 2012, 16). Narratives not only situate events in a certain light against a larger socio-material frame providing explanations in terms of the rational and affective reasons why individuals act in particular ways in certain situations (Hutto and Jurgens 2018), but they also provide schemas for habitual ways of navigating the world and introduce us to different kinds of affective framing patterns. Similarly, master narratives influence perception and decision-making, as they function “as vehicles and creators of values and ideology” (Ruston 2017, 28), and often lead to local narratives that reflect the structures and contents of the master narrative in further disseminating values and ideologies.
For this reason, in order to understand the decisions and actions of individuals, it is critical to examine the master and local narratives that they ascribe and relate to, as these particular narratives inform the individual’s relationships to socio-political events, agents, and institutions that they encounter in the world. Similar to Maiese and Hanna’s discussion of cognitive walls, Branigan (1992) and Ruston (2017) argue that there is an ongoing process of narrative comprehension where an individual employs trial and error to fit new experiences into previously established narrative schemas. Ruston explains that a narrative schema is understood as a pattern shared across different narratives that organizes information, such as beliefs, norms, and ways of being in and responding to the world, in a particular way. He argues that if the new experience or information that an
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individual encounters cannot be organized into an existing narrative schema, then either a new schema must be adopted and employed or, similar to a backfire effect, the information is rejected.
If we take ‘narrative comprehension’ here as not only the experience of encountering narratives, but also the ways in which individuals narratively experience and understand the world itself and how they understand themselves through their own personal narratives, then we can better understand how detrimental cognitive walls are developed, and how the backfire effect occurs. In regard to the study Maiese and Hanna discuss, a narrative analysis would focus on the local and master narratives the participants’ have already ascribed to, in order to further understand not only their ideological commitments but also what kinds of affective framing patterns and habits they’ve developed. These commitments will also be reflected in their personal narratives, how they see themselves in the world, where they’ve been and where they’re going. This additional narrative information can then help explain not only why they reject the corrective information, but also to predict and explain how they will reframe this information in order for it to align with their established narrative schemas and ways of being in the world. While there is an affective component at work here, this component is tied directly to the established narrative schemas that the participants have not just internalized, but embodied in terms of the kinds of habits and affective framing patterns that they have and the personal narrative they have constructed. Essentially, what is missing in Maiese and Hanna’s analysis of the backfire effect is the role that narrative comprehension plays in determining whether we’re ready to break down or reaffirm a cognitive wall.
Drawing on Walter Fisher’s (1984) work, Scott Ruston (2017, 34) argues that this kind of narrative comprehension matters as narratives are “another form of rationality that competes with and often supplants logical rationality as the basis of decision making.” Ruston sums up Fisher’s (1984) argument as being that “the logical rationality approach does not account for emotion, roles of beliefs and values, and many cases in which individuals and groups support positions for which there is no logical explanation” (Ruston 2017, 34). This is because narratives not only provide ways to rationally organize information and experiences, but as Maiese and Hanna only briefly discuss, they can also provide new forms of habits and affective frames that we might adopt. Depending on the particularities of the specific narrative and our familiarity and relationship to the characters and their experiences within those narratives, we may be more or less likely to adopt or reject the new information, affective frames, habits, or more generally, ways of being in the world that we encounter. The key point here is that narrative comprehension provides a different kind of rational engagement beyond pure logical reasoning, as they provide specific ways of feeling and being in the world that we otherwise might not have access to. Additionally, we encounter ideologies’ sets of beliefs, norms and practices much more regularly through narratives than we do in any other format. Rarely do we read, or are told, about these specific aspects of ideologies; rather we encounter them through narratives and our practical experiences in the world and understand them via narrative understanding. In essence, narratives are templates for making sense of the world and ourselves, and as such, utilizing a narrative analysis is essential for understanding when and how people are ready, and open, to break down their cognitive walls and adopt new ways of being in the world.
As an example, we can briefly examine how a particular master narrative can affect our habitual and affective ways of being in the world. As Peters (2012) argues, the neoliberal ideology has extended the principle of self-interest into the dominant paradigm for understanding not only politics and economics, but also for all behaviour and human action. A master narrative that functions in implementing and disseminating neoliberal ideology is the American Dream narrative. Hammack and Toolis (2015) discuss the impact of this master narrative in relation to studies of homeless youths (Erikson 1959; 1968). These studies showed that these youths had to contend with both economic hardship and stigmatization from others because of the American Dream master narrative. As this narrative attributes poverty and homelessness to individual characteristics, the youths struggled with being perceived as personally unruly, unmotivated, criminal, and pathological by others.
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Presumably, those who perceived the homeless youths in this way had adopted the habits and affective frames presented within the American Dream master narrative, and within local narratives that reflect the beliefs, norms, and practices presented in the master narrative. For example, the ideas that individuals both bear personal responsibility for their station in life and society and that hard work will lead to success, which are integrated with a habitual negative affective response towards perceived impoverished individuals. As these ideas and affective frames and responses are so deeply embedded in their habitual ways of being in the world, simply encountering these youths in the world and seeing their hardship was not enough to overcome and break down the cognitive walls these individuals had already established.
Nevertheless, despite the pressure of the American Dream narrative on themselves, Hammack and Toolis (2015, 357) found that homeless youth had developed “resistance to internalizing a sense of personal fault or failure, instead calling attention to structural disadvantage by highlighting the discrimination, violence, neglect, and alienation they faced.” While some of the people that the youth encountered embodied the habits and affective framing patterns of the American Dream master narrative, as exhibited in their judgements of the youths, the youths’ own experiences overrode this narrative in terms of their own self-assessment and personal narratives. In line with Maiese and Hanna’s analysis, this shows that personal experiences still have a significant determining factor in terms of which narratives we ascribe to and which we resist. Yet, simply encountering the homeless youths was not enough for some to break their cognitive wall and change their ingrained beliefs and practices. Rather, what may be needed for these individuals is a deeper narrative engagement with the fuller details of the personal narratives of the homeless youth on what it is like to become homeless and impoverished for the judgmental individuals to break their cognitive walls.
Although Maiese and Hanna are right in their claim that when an individual resists breaking down a cognitive wall this is because the individual is “desperately afraid of and deeply averse to” such a significant change in their habitual ways of being in the world, often times the reason why they are having these kinds of affective responses is because they are encountering an experience that does not fit with their established narrative understanding of the world and themselves. Or, in other words, they are experiencing something that is not consistent with the other stories they already believe to be true (Ruston 2017). By adopting a narrative analysis, Maiese and Hanna would have additional tools to further investigate and understand how individuals are persuaded to change their manifest values, beliefs, and ideologies, and in turn adopt new habits and affective framing patterns. Thus, if we want to find ways to help individuals’ break down their cognitive walls, avoid the backfire effect, and develop flexible habits of mind in order to resist, rebel, and revolutionize destructive deforming institutions and ideologies like neoliberalism, then we need to understand the essential role that narratives play in establishing, expressing, and resisting ideology. By embracing a narrative analysis, we can further elucidate how cognitive walls are established, and how we can break them down.
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Alan Jurgens © 2024
Author email: ajurgens[at]uow[dot]edu[dot]au
