Commentary
The Mind and the Political
Ali Teymoori
University of Bergen, NO
Teymoori, Ali. 2024. “The Mind and the Political.”
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 6, no. 1: 44-50. https://doi.org/10.33497/2024.summer.6.
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Abstract: In this commentary I present a brief overview of Maiese and Hanna’s work, The Mind-Body Politic, and highlight their valuable contribution in extending the insights from philosophy of mind to critically evaluate our contemporary social institutions and politics. Then I discuss some of the reservations and open questions about the way Maiese and Hanna lay out their version of a political philosophy of mind. In doing so, I focus on three main shortcomings in Maiese and Hanna’s work. First, I discuss how despite their critical view of Cartesian dualism, their own view of the way society is organized and works is dualistic. I argue that their dualistic view of society results in utopian thinking, and perhaps a more productive and constructive approach to our current predicaments would rather be an immanent critique. Second, I highlight the unclarity and confusion in some of their conceptual frameworks and their account of politics such as the way they use ideology and governmentality. Finally, I criticize their analysis of social institutions, especially the way they see new institutional structures can be formed. The project for a political philosophy of mind that Maiese and Hanna set up is worth pursuing and Maiese and Hanna already provide many hints and directions for its productive and constructive pursuit.
Keywords: Mind-body politics, political philosophy of mind, dualism, social institutions
The philosophy of mind has traditionally engaged with issues related to individual minds in isolation by focusing on issues such as mental function, representations, the problem of consciousness, and the mind-body relation. The recent interdisciplinary research of 4E cognition has stretched the boundaries of philosophical works on the mind, exploring the dynamics of the interactions between the mind, body, and the physical and social environment. Maiese and Hanna’s (2019) work, The Mind-Body Politic, sets a new ambition for philosophy of mind to develop a new critical and political philosophy of mind. They do engage with the classical problems of philosophy of mind, such as Cartesian mind-body dualism, and they use their own account of essentially embodied minds in response to mind-body dualism. Most remarkably though, they extend the essentially embodied mind thesis to develop “a critique of contemporary social institutions,” and as a result to change them for the better (2). Extending the essentially embodied minds thesis, they investigate a wide range of topics such as habit formation, mental health, and education. In the process, they analyze the influence of
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neoliberal institutions on the mind and how it is possible to develop new and constructive social institutions. This is indeed a very timely and highly needed work to extend the literature of embodied cognition to social and political life.
I am very sympathetic to Maiese and Hanna’s project to develop a political philosophy of mind. Maiese and Hanna argue that the current neoliberalism’s ever-increasing assault on normative social institutions has resulted in “destructive, deforming institutions,” which in turn foster “bad habits,” and mind-shaping expectations and activities that are driven by “false human needs.” It is also extremely informative that they show how the insight from embodied cognition, affective processes, and political philosophy can help us envisage and organize new social institutions that are productive and serve to improve human conditions. Having said that, I have some reservations and open questions about the way Maiese and Hanna lay out their project. In this commentary, I present a very brief account of Maiese and Hanna’s political philosophy of mind and present my own questions and critique regarding the general outline of their project. I focus on three main shortcomings: 1) their dualistic view of the way society is organized and works, 2) the confusion in some of their conceptual frameworks and their account of politics, and finally 3) their analysis of the social institutions, especially the way they envision how new institutional structures can be formed.
THE PROBLEM OF DUALITY
Maiese and Hanna criticize the Cartesian mind-body duality, and present their account of the essentially embodied mind with three main theses. The first thesis is the mind-shaping thesis according to which social institutions such as family and the education system constantly and saliently determine, restrain, and reframe our embodied mind. Second, they argue that most neoliberal social institutions shape our minds in a detrimental way that would alienate us and enslave our minds, hence their collective sociopathy thesis. The third and final thesis is the collective wisdom thesis, in which they argue that through a few institutions, or by creation of new constructive institutions, people can strive for self-realization, liberate themselves from dystopian neoliberal social institutions, and achieve a deeply happy life.
Maiese and Hanna present a persuasive account of embodied mind to overcome Descartes’ mind-body dualism, but they retain an essentially dualistic thinking about the way in which society works, structuring their argument dualistically with destructive vs. constructive institutions, false vs. true needs, bad vs. good habits, false vs. true freedom, coercion vs. autonomy, false vs. true consciousness, and so on. For instance, the authors categorized the need as “(i) true human needs and (ii) false human needs” (98, emphases in original). This also results in a simplistic account of the way in which society works and goes through changes: “constructive, enabling institutions can be generated simply by negating each criterion in the list of working criteria for destructive/deforming institutions in contemporary neoliberal democratic societies, and then reformulating each negated criterion in positive terms” (227, my emphasis). This presents a simple dualistic view of society, opposing the current dystopian world with their own vision of a utopian society.
That is not to say that I do not agree with their characterization of the destructive effects of the neoliberal assault on the global population and our normative institutions, and in particular its destructive effect on people’s lives and minds. Things are even worse than neoliberalism in many parts of the world such that there is a radical neoliberalism for the poor, but a radical protectionism and socialism for the rich (also known as the bailout economy). Nor do I deny the need for new and constructive institutions to organize things differently. However, I would argue that there is not a clear-cut dualism of good and evil. In addition, I found it problematic to try to impose a vision of utopia on society as a whole. The authors have a universalistic idea of what a good society would look like, claiming that it is normatively a better world to live in for everyone. They assume that they have a universal vision of a utopian society in which everyone gets a satisfaction of their true needs and exercises their
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true freedom. They derive the legitimacy of their vision of society from normative principles which are beyond the potential reservations of those who might find themselves subject to it.
Instead of imposing externally justified standards to analyze the present, a more constructive approach to deal with our current predicament is to expose how the existing institutional frameworks and social reality fail to live up to their own normative claims, that is, by using an immanent critique. In doing so, one can expose the limits of the current political conditions and leave open possibilities that are available to society to organize itself differently.
One of the pioneers of immanent critique was indeed Karl Marx (1976), when he moved away from his earlier humanist and utopian vision to study capital from a scientific vantage point. He showed the irrationality of the rational discourse of political economy and the capitalist mode of production. He did so by focusing on classical political economy’s contradictions as well as the lived experiences of the working class of industrial capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries. In contrast, Maiese and Hanna express their explicit intention to rely on earlier Marx for their design of a new humanistic and utopian society, which led to their dualistic vision of society. It seems to me that it was the limits of that dualistic way of viewing society that led Marx to his later use of immanent critique.
THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE
The inherently dualistic thinking in Maiese and Hanna’s work brings up the second shortcoming of the book: their problematic account of politics. According to Maiese and Hanna, neoliberalism creeps into our everyday life and breeds false needs and false freedom of choices. They claim that the neoliberal ideology coalesces with a scientific worldview, aiming at controlling society, and such a neoliberal ideology can lead to coercive authoritarianism, causing collective sociopathy.
There are several problematic issues in the conceptual framework of political structure in The Mind-Body Politic. First, there is a confusion in the definition of neoliberalism. They laid down their account of neoliberalism at the beginning of the book as a political doctrine encompassing classical Hobbesian liberalism with a conception of individuals as egoist seeking their own self-interested goals, big capitalism with its multinational and global corporate structure, and scientifically minded technocracy (3-4 & 103). Later, they rely on a different definition of neoliberalism as a policy framework, an ideology, and a form of governmentality (125). Do these three parts form a definition of neoliberalism as a political doctrine? That seems to be the case since they sporadically refer to David Harvey’s account as well, who treats neoliberalism as a hegemonic political project. How is neoliberalism as a form of governmentality related to neoliberalism as an ideology? It seems that they consider centrism, conservatism, and other narratives as loosely formulated dominant ideological narratives that justify neoliberal forms of governmentality. That is at least my understanding of their political analysis and clarification is required to see if that is a correct reading. In my view, some caution is warranted in integrating such different approaches.
For instance, combining ideology and governmentality needs proper justification and clarification. Maiese and Hanna present various accounts of ideology such as an epistemological-philosophical account in terms of false consciousness (e.g., Tommie Shelby’s account of ideology as misrepresentation of reality and hidden injustice, 260), the political meaning of ideology as ideas of ruling class (Larner’s definition of neoliberalism as ideology, 126), and also ideology as a system of beliefs, values, and social imagination (referring to Sally Haslanger’s idea of “deep schema,” 262). Given their distinction between destructive and constructive institutions, and also between false and true needs, they take the task of ideology critique to be uncovering the underlying truth that the dominant narrative or social imagination attempts to hide. They also talk about changing people’s
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conceptual frames of reference for a critical understanding of reality (263). In contrast, there is no distinction in the governmentality account between what goes on at the surface and what is the underlying truth. Instead, in Foucault’s account of governmentality, everything is on the surface, and in the way in which particular practices or modes of subjectivity are related to relations of power and rationalities of government.
My impression is that Foucault’s (2008) governmentality can shed light on the main problems associated with neoliberal capitalist system, such that a body of knowledge is produced (e.g., human capital, effective demand, freedom, competition, behavioral economics) in particular relations of power (e.g., political interests, a reform of administrative and legal system, reformed labor market) with major truth effects for the formation of individuals’ subjectivity (e.g., their needs, desires, ideals, hard and soft skills, and expectations). It is precisely this neoliberal form of subjectivity that seems problematic for Maiese and Hanna, though their explanations get a bit more confusing when they also try to explain neoliberalism from a variety of other perspectives.
Maiese and Hanna showed the destructive effect of neoliberalism on individual minds through two case studies, including the mental health and education system. These examples are very illuminating and instructive, though still some of the confusion in conceptual frameworks persist. For instance, the authors use Foucault’s concept of governmentality to explain individuals’ understanding of themselves through mental health practices. At the same time, they use the concept of ideology to explain widespread mental health practices. More precisely, in explaining their account of mental health, they oppose the “value-free” and naturalistic account of psychiatry, claiming that “the ideology of mental health is a socially constructed myth” (176). Then they consider how the medical model of psychiatry is part of “the larger ideological framework of . . . [what they call] socio-scientism” (180). How governmentality is related to ideological practices is not at all clear, nor is the relation between ideology and socio-scientism. Does it mean that when someone is seeking a professional mental health service, they are buying into the ideology of hegemonic neoliberal ideals? I doubt that Maiese and Hanna would agree with such a generalization, and it seems to me what they mean is that the knowledge from scientific mental health practices and psychiatry serve different human interests, and might not be in line with social emancipatory ideals, as one might derive from Habermas’ (1987) Knowledge and Human Interests. At least, that is my impression.
Finally, Maiese and Hanna list eight criteria of collective sociopathy, including commodification, mechanization, coercion, divided mind, reversal of affect, loss of autonomy, incentivization of desires, and false consciousness. They do not provide sufficient reasons why one has to consider these eight criteria to examine social phenomena and institutions, and to see whether they are normal or whether they fulfill the criteria for sociopathy. It seems to me that they rely on later Marx to elucidate the way in which a particular technological infrastructure and mode of production, consumption, and circulation reproduce a particular mode of daily life, mental conceptions of the world, social relations, and a relation to the nature (Marx 1976, 493, for a clear elucidation of Marx’s methodology on this point; Harvey 2010, 195). I see a potential for the integration of Marx’s later works with Foucault’s account of governmentality to provide insight into our predicaments, and to present a scientifically rigorous account of a detrimental effect of the hegemonic neoliberal mode of subjectivity and models of social institutions in our time. Although there are traces of such a successful integration in Maiese and Hanna’s work, it remains quite vague and fragmentary.
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Finally, regarding the formation of new institutions, Maiese and Hanna remain at a general level and ambiguous. For instance, they characterize the new enabling constructive institutions to be those that afford the flexible mental habits of curiosity, imagination, empathy, and humility (236-7). This sounds interesting indeed and such a social institution would be constructive. They intend to achieve the formation of new enabling social
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institutions through what they call “reverse social engineering” and through enactive-transformative learning (246). Later they clarify that this transformative learning involves changing “problematic frames of reference, which include habits of mind, meaning perspectives, assumptions, and expectations” (247, emphasis in original). As shown in the next two paragraphs, it is surprising that the solution and resistance to dystopian social institutions end up being able to change one’s perspectives, assumptions, and expectations through new institutions.
Although I found their approach to bring about new social institutions very interesting, it might need to address a few issues for its realization. First, it seems to me that their solution might turn into another individualistic account of social change. The authors focus on changing individuals’ frames of reference and flexible habits of mind to bring about change and to construct new constructive social institutions. The solution seems to be basically the same for our neoliberal planners that seek to address unemployment problems through self-assertion techniques and job interview skills. Many social changes take place through collective actions and social movements as well as political organizations that heed the cry of the grass-root movements. Changing one’s perspectives and assumptions would make individuals more sympathetic toward progressive social movements, but it is not sufficient for a social change. To create new social institutions, it is also necessary to form or have an organizational and political structure to make the necessary social change. Otherwise, all of these individualistic solutions are likely to be co-opted in the cultural logic of late capitalism (Jameson 1991; Sennett 2006).
This brings me to the second issue with regards to Maiese and Hanna’s account of social change: that the intermediary process between the political and the mental remains obscure. That is, the process of change from individuals’ minds to social institutions is not clear. As I have just shown, some of the solutions regarding individuals’ changes in their frames of reference are individualistic and might fall into the logic of late capitalism. How can one be sure that the change in frames of references and flexible habits of mind would be in the service of the emancipatory ideals? Are these solutions not already widespread through self-help books? Maiese and Hanna do emphasize that the change in frame of references should occur through the constructive enabling of social institutions and transformative learning. This means that the popular self-help books do not qualify for bringing about transformative learning. Moreover, there are also sometimes references indicating that an institutional change is necessary for a flexible habit of mind and creative thinking, i.e., a top-down process of change though transformative learning. Though still, the process of change from individuals’ frames of reference to social institutions and vice versa can perhaps be better illuminated.
It is also a bit surprising that the solution Maiese and Hanna offer based on emancipatory social and political theories is just a learning process. Quite ironically, the neoliberals would love this solution. It is in line with their own solutions as well: empowerment, self-help, and more therapeutic and counseling services. Maiese and Hanna set themselves against the neoliberal models of society, but the solution they provide for the creation of new institutions is in line with the therapeutic culture of our neoliberal era (cf. Madsen 2020). Perhaps a durable and transformative change in mental habits and frames of references requires a more fundamental change in society such as a change in technical infrastructure, labor market, and its mode of production and reproduction, as later Marx would have it, but that topic is beyond the purpose of the current discussion.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Mind–Body Politic starts with a thesis for a political philosophy of mind. Maiese and Hanna’s main aim is to demonstrate the destructive and deformative effect of neoliberal political economy on people’s essentially embodied minds and advocate building new social institutions that would improve people’s embodied minds according to certain normative and emancipatory principles. There are several main shortcomings that
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significantly undermine Maiese and Hanna’s account of mind-body politics. These include their dualistic and Manichean view of society, their unclear account of politics, and their individualistic and therapeutic solutions to our current predicaments. Their social and political account did not consider the nuances and complexities across different social and political theories, and sometimes various concepts were used in a convoluted way. It would have been helpful to keep distinct concepts apart or at least clarify the nuances that exist between various theories and concepts. For instance, neoliberalism is not the same as neoconservatism and centrism, although their interests might coalesce at times. Governmentality is not the same as ideology, though they might sometimes study the same object.
On a minor, but no less important point, the authors’ writing seems more like a manifesto than a philosophical argument. I take that to be a wake-up call for a critical and political philosophy of mind. In addition, the authors provide a long list of books and perspectives that have inspired their approach which I found impressive (7 and passim) and their references to others read more like an alliance formation (we agree/disagree with . . .) than a critical engagement. I take that to be part of the goal of their work and a task for us to consider the broader political implications of our scientific and philosophical works (Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is quite illuminating for this point). Finally, Maiese and Hanna’s version of resisting the destructive social institutions fits somehow ironically with the culture of late capitalism, being individualistic and consistent with the widespread dominant therapeutic culture and empowerment literature. Perhaps that is a sign of the difficulty of the task for bringing social change that lies ahead of us!
The aim of The Mind-Body Politic to develop a political philosophy of mind is quite ambitious and several questions still remain open. We must still ask how one can apply the insight from embodied minds to analyze our current socio-political conditions and what are the ways in which such insights from embodied minds can help us develop more constructive social institutions. I do think the project that Maiese and Hanna set up is worth pursuing, and they already provide many hints and directions for its productive and constructive pursuit.
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References
Foucault, Michel. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1972 [1968]. Knowledge and Human Interests, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press.
Harvey, David. 2010. A Companion to Marx's Capital. London: Verso Books.
Jameson, Frederic. 1991. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press.
Madsen, Ole Jacob. 2020. “Therapeutic Cultures: Historical Perspectives.” In The Routledge International Handbook of Global Therapeutic Cultures, edited by Daniel Nehring, Ole Jacob Madsen, Edgar Cabanas, China Mills, and Dylan Kerrigan, 14-24. London: Routledge.
Maiese, Michelle, and Robert Hanna. 2019. The Mind-Body Politic. Cham: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Marx, Karl. 1976. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1. London: Penguin Books.
Sennett, Richard. 2006. The Culture of the New Capitalism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shelby, Tommie. 2003. “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory.” The Philosophical Forum 34, no. 2: 153–188.
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Ali Teymoori © 2024
Author email: ali[dot]teymoori[at]uib[dot]no
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