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Editorial
An Introduction to Expressiveness: Perception and Emotions
in the Experience of Expressive Objects Book Symposium
Iman Roohnavazi
San José State University, CA
Roohnavaz, Iman. 2025. “An Introduction to Expressiveness: Perception and Emotions
in the Experience of Expressive Objects Book Symposium.” Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 7, no. 2: i-iv. https://doi.org/10.33497/2025.summer.0i.
Abstract: Marta Benenti’s Expressiveness: Perception and Emotions in the Experience of Expressive Objects is of interest not only to philosophers and aestheticians but also to a broader community of thinkers concerned with the conceptual analysis of affective states and with how such states are ascribed to inanimate objects. Considering the valuable commentaries included in this book symposium, this introduction seeks to guide the reader through Benenti’s work—primarily by drawing on her own words rather than paraphrasing, so as to avoid interpretive ambiguity at this stage—and to highlight the rich ways in which Benenti’s work and the accompanying commentaries invite further exploration.
Keywords: expressiveness, Perception, Emotion, Core Affect, Non-conceptual Content, Cognitive Interventions
Benenti undertakes three tasks in her enlightening work, Expressiveness: Perception and Emotions in the Experience of Expressive Objects: exploring what expressiveness is, examining “the experience one can have of this phenomenon,” and offering “an account of expressiveness that strives to avoid some of the problems of the already existing theories” (Benenti 2020, 3).
The book’s concern begins with an attention to details that many typically overlook—but which philosophers, in particular, do not. Seeing a dark, cloudy day as depressing at first glance might seem ordinary, yet for a contemplative and curious mind who is critical and analytic about the concepts, it leads to a question that asks for clarification of how an affective state such as depressing is tied to an inanimate
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object, dark, cloudy day (Benenti 2020, 7). The question arises specifically because “if one takes expression of emotions to be the outward manifestation of internal conditions, it is inconsistent to believe that inanimate objects can be expressive” (Benenti 2020, 37).
It has been a long tradition in the history of philosophy—sometimes, I should say, unfortunately neglected though—that philosophers, when wanting to come up with their view about a big question, start by providing a quasi-encyclopedic and historical account of at least the canonical responses of other thinkers about the said view. Benenti does the same, among which are supporters of pathetic fallacy—which says “the experience of something as expressive, and the subsequent attribution of an affective character, is just a mistake. And such a mistake is explained by the fact that the subject of the experience (and utterer of the judgement) is under the influence of an emotion” (Benenti 2020, 9)—arousalism—which “stems from the intuition that the emotions that we attribute to objects do depend on those objects, but only as long as they provoke some affective reaction in us” (Benenti 2020, 31)—contour theory—according to which “we perceive music as expressive insofar as it resembles typical vocal expressions and behaviours that human beings perform when experiencing and expressing emotions” (Benenti 2020, 38)—alongside some other theories, critically analyzing the strengths and shortcomings of them, providing the reader with a good summary of the literature.
For instance, Benenti’s critical analysis—which also guides the reader more deeply into the literature—clarifies that “explaining objects’ expressiveness in terms of a pathetic fallacy amounts to considering such expressiveness as a case of illusion” (Benenti 2020, 11), and that “the burden of the illusion is entirely on the wrong judgement that follows from this illusory experience” (Benenti 2020, 14). Yet, a phenomenological analysis shows that even though “a sad-looking landscape may look sad because of our being sad, but we ascribe sadness to it because of its specific way of appearing to us under certain conditions” (Benenti 2020, 25), as “Richard Wagner’s The Valkyries is hardly experienced as a cheerful piece, whereas, usually, Jingle Bells is not considered mournful” (Benenti 2020, 29). Or regarding contour theory, even though, “it can be true that, sometimes, we notice resemblances between certain musical tones and typically expressive tones of voice, but this does not amount to saying that when we experience a piece of music as melancholy we necessarily experience it as resembling a melancholy behaviour. Rather, intuitively, things might work the other way round” (Benenti 2020, 42). That said, in some of these endeavors, clarification remains crucial. For instance, as Rebecca Copenhaver and Jay Odenbaugh emphasize there is a need for conceptual clarity regarding secondary meaning—essential for Benenti’s project. The absence of such clarification risks misrepresenting Benenti as a proponent of certain positions she seeks to critically engage with—and, in some respects, to challenge (9). This call for precision not only safeguards interpretive accuracy but also invites further inquiry for readers attuned to the philosophical stakes of Benenti’s project.
The mentioned theoretical interplay culminates in her engagement with complex cases—most notably “Weeping Willow” (Benenti 2020, 101) and the more intricate “The Case of the Minor Chord” (Benenti 2020, 111)—which serve both to orient the reader within the relevant literature and to scaffold the emergence of her own position, which is rooted in several of the views examined, especially because “most criteria that can be found in the literature do not fulfil the task of explaining what is so special about expressive experience” (Benenti 2020, 83).
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By clarifying the differences among expressive, aesthetic, formal, and arousal properties (Benenti 2020, 127), and emphasizing the role of imagination in “draw[ing] sophisticated connections between perceptual patterns and complex emotions” (Benenti 2020, 139), unsurprisingly, Benenti begins to articulate her own view at the very juncture where the discussed theories converge, i.e., “on the idea that our expressive experiences are perceptual in character” (Benenti 2020, 62). This enables her to take a phenomenological stance, subsequently addressing the objective dimension of expressive experience—an approach that finds strong support in the analysis of artistic works (Benenti 2020, 118)—María José Alcaraz León opens a discussion on whether there is a need for “inherent affective” features that “guarantee one’s expressive experience to be rightly anchored in the object’s non-expressive features”(16)—a question that, in my reading, also invites readers to explore the difference between an inherent connection (which doesn’t require each side to have inherent features) and inherent features (the qualities of the individual components).
That said, the mentioned stance guides Benenti to emphasize “that expressive experience at its basic level is rooted in our core affect dimensional system” (Benenti 2020, 171)—as Russell says “core affect is a neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible as a simple, nonreflective feeling that is an integral blend of hedonic (pleasure–displeasure) and arousal (sleepy–activated) values” (Benenti 2020, 158). This nonreflective quality opens a path toward highlighting the non-conceptual content of expressive experience (Benenti 2020, 161). That said, Benenti argues that her approach—both perceptualist and compatibilist—still “allows for cognitive interventions that make the resulting experience partly response-dependent” (Benenti 2020, 171). What is important, though, is that such recognitional processes are “not mobilised by resemblances to which concepts apply metaphorically, but rather [are] grounded in core affect and compatible with secondary uses of concepts” (Benenti 2020, 171).
Informative discussions continue to emerge around how best to categorize this stance—such as the one Matteo Ravasio highlights, which interprets Benenti as an antiformalist, while pointing to formalist aspects within her position and inviting further clarification (23). Alternatively, readers like myself may see the central thrust of her work as a critical engagement with—and simultaneous development of—established categorizations, rather than a position that neatly falls within any single category.
All that said—and setting aside the never-ending concerns regarding the indeterminate aspects of rich works like Benenti’s, which can only be chiseled over time and through contributions such as those offered in this book symposium—as well as the simply stated yet profoundly deep questions that continue to invite philosophers, aestheticians, and all who care about such matters to reflect, such as the one Yujia Song draws attention to: “Why think that the affective qualities we ascribe to simple features are expressive qualities in the first place?”(27)—Benenti’s detailed and analytical engagement with various accounts of expressiveness renders her contribution particularly valuable.
I share in her wish at the end of the précis that “at best, [her work] also manages to put forward an original account that hoards the most convincing insights of already available theories while amending their weaknesses,” paving the way for further work (4).
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References
Benenti, Marta. 2020. Expressiveness. Perception and Emotions in the Experience of Expressive Objects. Berlin, GER/Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter GmbH.
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Iman Roohnavaz © 2025
Author email: iman[dot]roohnavaz[at]sjsu[dot]edu
