Commentary

Epiphanies of Existence

Luca Zanetti

University of Bologna, IT

Zanetti, Luca. 2026. “Commentary on Epiphanies: Epiphanies of Existence.”

 Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 7, no. 2: 5-15. https://doi.org/10.33497/2026.winter.2. 

Abstract: In this commentary, I will discuss a particular category of epiphanies, which we might call “epiphanies of existence.” These are experiences in which the existence of something (oneself, a bird, or the whole) is suddenly revealed through a specific pathos. I will focus on the reports of six experiences (by Coleridge, Hadot, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Kant, Murdoch), but I shall mostly concentrate on Wittgenstein’s, Sartre’s and Murdoch’s interpretations of their own respective experiences. I will begin my discussion by highlighting common features between their accounts, suggesting on this ground that they are all undergoing the same type of experience. Then I shall argue that Sartre’s epiphany of existence, as described in his novel Nausea, is not, contrary to what Chappell thinks, a dysepiphany. Finally, I shall argue that Murdochs’ epiphany of the kestrel, one of Chappell’s favorite examples of epiphany, is indeed an epiphany of existence akin to the one described by Sartre in Nausea. On this ground, I shall argue that Chappell’s reading of Murdoch’s epiphany might be wrong. 

Keywords: Epiphanies, existence, Roquentin, Wittgenstein, wonder, Sophie Grace Chappell, Murdoch

In this commentary, I aim to discuss a specific category of epiphanies that we might label as epiphanies of existence—experiences wherein the existence of something (whether oneself, a bird, or the world) is suddenly revealed through a particular pathos. I share Chappell's perspective on the importance of having a rich array of examples in mind while discussing epiphanies. For this reason, in this commentary I will quote six experiences that I regard as epiphanies of existence. 

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I will begin with a discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s epiphany of existence and I shall compare it with reports from Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Pierre Hadot, and Jean-Paul Sartre. I shall argue that their reports exhibit similar features that suggest that they are in fact living the same kind of experience. 

Then I shall argue against Chappell’s claim that Roquentin’s epiphany, as described in Sartre’s novel Nausea, is an instance of dysepiphany (that is, to a first approximation, a negative epiphanic experience). I shall highlight some positive features that Sartre describes in his novel (and in this context I shall quote Immanuel Kant’s epiphany of existence). The aim of this section is to suggest that it is hard to interpret epiphanies and, in particular, that it is not easy to understand whether some epiphany is positive or negative. This is an important point which, to my mind, is not stressed with sufficient force in Chappell’s book.

Finally, in the last section, I will argue that Murdoch’s epiphany of the hovering kestrel, one of Chappell’s favorite examples of epiphanies, is indeed interpreted by Murdoch herself as being an epiphany of existence. This will put pressure on Chappell’s interpretation of Murdoch’s experience (and on her negative interpretation of Roquentin’s epiphany). If I am right, there is no big difference between Murdoch and Roquentin’s epiphanies. Again, this is an instance that shows how hard it is to interpret and assess epiphanies. 

EXPLORING THE EPIPHANY OF EXISTENCE 

Chappell rightly notes that “It is striking how little moral theorists generally have to say about the experience that [. . .] are very often the real persuasive foundation of their theories” (Chappell 2022, 55). Although Wittgenstein is not a moral theorist in the sense in which Chappell is using the term in this context, Wittgenstein is surely someone who is explicit about the experiences that inspire his moral thinking. In the Lecture on Ethics, in order to illustrate to his audience what he means by absolute good, Wittgenstein mentions three experiences. The first, his experience “par excellence” (Wittgenstein 1965, 8), in this context, is introduced with these words. 

“I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world [italics in the original]. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as “how extraordinary that anything should exist” or “how extraordinary that the world should exist” (Wittgenstein 1965, 8). 

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein describes as ”mystical” the fact that the world is, contrasting the fact that the world is with how the world is: “The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is” (Wittgenstein 1961, 6.44). The experience described in the Lecture on Ethics is, thus, the experience of the mystical, that is, the experience that the world is. 

The difference between how the world (or something) is and the that of the world (or something) plays a crucial role in other experiences that might all be regarded as epiphanies of existence. Consider, for instance, the following experience described by Coleridge [1]:

“Hast thou ever raised thy mind to the consideration of existence, in and by itself, as the mere act of existing? Hast thou ever said to thyself thoughtfully, It is! Heedless in that moment, whether it were a 

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man before thee, or a flower, or a grain of sand,—without reference, in short, to this or that particular mode or form of existence? If thou hast indeed attained to this, thou wilt have felt the presence of a mystery, which must have fixed thy spirit in awe and wonder. The very words,—There is nothing! or,—There was a time, when there was nothing! are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the proposition with as full and instantaneous a light, as if it bore evidence against the fact in the right of its own eternity. 

Not to be, then, is impossible: to be, incomprehensible. If thou hast mastered this intuition of absolute existence, thou wilt have learnt likewise, that it was this, and no other, which in the earlier ages seized the nobler minds, the elect among men, with a sort of sacred horror. This it was that first caused them to feel within themselves a something ineffably greater than their own individual nature." (Quoted in Arendt 1978, 144-5). 

In this epiphany, what strikes one is the sheer existence of what exists, rather than what exists or how what exists exists. Coleridge explicitly emphasizes this aspect: “Heedless in that moment, whether it were a man before thee, or a flower, or a grain of sand,—without reference, in short, to this or that particular mode or form of existence” (Quoted in Arendt 1978, 144-5). 

Another crucial shared feature among epiphanies of existence is the presence of a particular pathos. In each case, there is a profound sense of surprise manifested in forms such as awe, wonder, or astonishment. But this surprise is often accompanied with darker feelings. In the passage quoted Coleridge speaks of sacred horror.[2] To further illustrate this point, we might consider two reports that seem to describe similar epiphanies of existence. 

Consider how Pierre Hadot describes this experience from his adolescence.

“Indeed, I have long had the impression of having been in the world only from the time I became an adolescent. I will always regret having thrown away - out of Christian humility - my first handwritten notes that were an echo of the birth of my personality, for it is very difficult for me now to rediscover the psychological content of the overwhelming discoveries I made then. I do remember their context. One happened on rue Ruinart, on the route I took home to my parents' house every day from the Petit Seminaire. Night had fallen. The stars were shining in the immense sky. At this time one could still see them. Another took place in a room of our house. In both cases I was filled with an anxiety that was both terrifying and delicious, provoked by the sentiment of the presence of the world, or of the Whole, and of me in that world. [. . .] I experienced a sentiment of strangeness, of astonishment, and of wonder at being there. At the same time I had the sentiment of being immersed in the world, of being a part of it, the world extending from the smallest blade of grass to the stars. This world was present to me, intensely present." (Hadot 2008, 5-6) 

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In Hadot’s case, the particular entity that evokes wonder is the sky (also Wittgenstein’s example in his lecture [3]), yet he also acknowledges that the mystery of existence extends “from the smallest blade of grass to the stars." And the emotion that existence evokes is wonder but also strangeness, astonishment, and an anxiety that is both terrifying and delicious. 

Similar mixed feelings can be found in another famous epiphany of existence, namely Roquentin’s epiphany in Jean Paul Sartre’s novel Nausea. 

“And suddenly, suddenly, the veil is torn away, I have understood, I have seen. [. . .] So I was in the park just now. The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk in the ground just under my bench. I couldn’t remember it was a root any more. The words had vanished and with them the significance of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have traced on their surface. I was sitting, stooping forward, head bowed, alone in front of this black, knotty mass, entirely beastly, which frightened me. Then I had this vision. 

It left me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I understood the meaning of “existence.” (Sartre [1938] 1965, 151-2) 

In Roquentin’s case, the experience is provoked by a chestnut root, but it could have been any other object. In fact, throughout Sartre’s novel, Roquentin undergoes the same experience (with different degrees of intensity and clarity) with many different objects, the first of which is a stone (Sartre [1938] 1965, 26). Here the emotion evoked by existence is also one of fear (more on Roquentin’s emotional reactions below).

These experiences prompt individuals (or at least should prompt them) to pose essential questions to themselves: Am I accurately identifying my emotion? Why am I feeling it? Is it an appropriate response to what I am witnessing? None of these questions has straightforward answers—as it is evident to anyone who has undergone an epiphany of existence or any epiphany, for that matter. Moreover, none of these questions should be taken lightly, as one's responses can have profound existential implications, a point brilliantly illustrated by Chappell through numerous examples in her book. 

Perhaps Wittgenstein pondered similar questions himself. In any case, he appears to offer an answer to the second question (and implicitly, to the third question as well). Later in the same lecture, he suggests that one could describe the experience of wonder at the existence of the world in another way, namely as “the experience of seeing the world as a miracle” (Wittgenstein 1965, 11). In everyday life, we typically associate a miracle with an event we've never seen and find inexplicable. For instance, Wittgenstein illustrates this by stating that we would consider it a miracle if someone in the audience suddenly grew a lion's head and began to roar. However, Wittgenstein adds, our usual way of viewing things presupposes that every event has some explanation—the “scientific way of looking at a fact” (Wittgenstein 1965, 17). Yet, “it is clear that when we look at it in this way everything miraculous has disappeared” (Wittgenstein 1965, 10). While the fact can still be labeled as a miracle, it is only in a relative sense, indicating something we cannot explain based on our current understanding of the world's workings. In contrast, an absolute miracle is an event that, in principle, cannot be explained. Wittgenstein introduces the distinction between relative and absolute miracles to convey the point that the experience of wonder at the existence of the world can also be articulated as the experience of seeing the world as an absolute miracle (Wittgenstein 1965, 11). 

At this juncture, it is important to distinguish, as Chappell usefully suggests (Chappell 2022, 38-9), between experience and one’s conceptual framing of the experience. As Chappell also notes (Chappell 2022, 394-5), the experience itself might be imbued with concepts or anyway partially shaped by one’s previous convictions, so 

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one’s interpretation of the experience is likely to be part of the very epiphanic experience. Yet, the distinction is important in order to evaluate epiphanies. Wittgenstein here is providing an interpretation (which is part of the conceptual framing of his experience) of what happens when he lives what he describes (again, a conceptual framing) as the experience of wonder at the existence of the world. But perhaps the same experience might have been interpreted (and lived) not so much as the experience of feeling wonder at the unexplainable existence of the world, but rather as the experience of feeling wonder before the existence of a world whose existence is explained by God. Wittgenstein discusses this possibility (Wittgenstein 1965, 14-15), but he seems to dismiss it.[4] The real miracle that is experienced in this epiphany is not, for Wittgenstein, that God created everything, but rather that everything exists with no explanation (which is another way of saying that everything exists with no creator).[5] Be that as it may, the question here is not whether Wittgenstein is right in his interpretation of his own experience; the point is just to appreciate how one can reason about conflicting conceptual framings and how crucial this reflection is. 

When Roquentin experiences his breakthrough, he comes to conclusions which are strikingly similar to Wittgenstein’s. He draws the distinction between relative and absolute absurdity (Sartre [1938] 1965, 154), which parallels the distinction between relative and absolute miracle. Ordinarily, things are experienced as absurd when they contrast with what we ordinarily regard as normal; but the existence of everything can’t be contrasted to anything.[6] In this connection, he also notes that the “the world of explanations and reasons is not the world of existence” (Sartre [1938] 1965, 154). For existence is beyond explanation (anything purporting to explain existence will itself be something rather than nothing). 

To sum up, I have argued that there is a family of experiences, the epiphanies of existence, which have at least the following common features: in them, existence is encountered through a particular pathos; what matters in the experience is not what is experienced or how the world is experienced to be, but rather the sheer fact that something exists or that indeed the whole is. Moreover, I have suggested, following Wittgenstein and Sartre’s interpretations of their own experiences, that what evokes wonder in these epiphanies is the apprehension that existence is beyond any possible explanation. More can be said about such experiences and their correct interpretations, but I hope I have given some grounds to believe that there actually is a particular kind of experience, the epiphany of existence (for more discussion on epiphanies of existence, see Zanetti 2022, 2023, 2025a, 2025b, forthcoming 1, 2).

ROQUENTIN’S EPIPHANY OF EXISTENCE AS A DYSEPIPHANY?

In her book, Chappell selects Roquentin’s example as an instance of what she calls dysepiphany: ”some epiphanies are profoundly bleak and upsetting, sapping our psychic resources rather than refreshing them—they are epiphanies sure enough, but, we might say, they are dysepiphanic” (Chappell 2022, 221). In this section I would like to suggest that Chappell’s interpretation might be wrong. This is important not only in so far as we are interested in providing the correct interpretation of Roquentin’s epiphany. It is important because it warns us to be cautious in our interpretations of epiphanies. 

To assess Chappell’s claim about Roquentin, let’s give another look at Sartre’s novel. The novel tells the story of Roquentin's attempt to understand his nausea. In the first part of the story, Roquentin knows that something is wrong, but he doesn't know what is happening to him. In other words, he doesn't know why he is experiencing 

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what he describes as "nausea". At a certain point—which is the central moment of the entire novel—Roquentin finally understands his nausea. This is Roquentin's epiphany, the flash of insight that gives him access to the mystery of existence.

Now before (and perhaps even during and after) the experience of the chestnut, Roquentin’s relation to things and events is in many ways quite negative (as Chappell herself notices). But the epiphanic moment itself is not lived only negatively (and this is what Chappell fails to appreciate because she focuses on passages that indicate that the experience was somehow negative). Here are some passages that show this point: 

This moment was extraordinary. I was there, motionless and icy, plunged in a horrible ecstasy. 

But something fresh had just appeared in the very heart of this ecstasy; I understood the Nausea, I possessed it. [. . .] The essential thing is contingency. I mean that one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there; those who exist let themselves be encountered, but you can never deduce anything from them. I believe there are people who have understood this. Only they tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. But no necessary being can explain existence: contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be dissipated; it is the absolute, consequently, the perfect free gift. All is free, this park, this city and myself. When you realize that, it turns your heart upside down and everything begins to float [. . .]: here is Nausea. (Sartre [1938] 1965, 156-7) 

Roquentin understands (or so he thinks) the truth about his nausea and existence, and this is valuable for him. Moreover, everything is seen as a “perfect free gift,” for it does not belong to anyone, no one can create or donate it––in order to donate it, you must already exist. And when you appreciate it, then “everything begins to float,” because there is nothing that causes or grounds the existence of what exists. This is where one feels what Kant describes in the Critique of Pure Reason, and this is, I think, Kant’s epiphany of existence: 

The unconditioned necessity, which we need so indispensably as the ultimate sustainer of all things, is for human reason a true abyss. Even eternity [...] does not make such a dizzying impression on the mind; for eternity only measures the duration of things, but it does not sustain that duration. One cannot resist the thought of it, but one cannot bear it that a being that we represent to ourselves as the highest among all possible beings might, as it were, say to itself: “I am from eternity to eternity, outside me is nothing except what is something merely through my will; but whence then am I?” Here everything gives way beneath us, the greatest perfection as well as the smallest, hovers without support before speculative reason, for which it would cost nothing to let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle." (Kant A613/B641) 

The epiphany begins when one understands the implications of the question “whence then am I?”: then “everything gives way beneath us . . .”, for here one understands that even the supposed unconditioned necessity, however sui generis it might be, if it is something, it is something whose existence is beyond explanation. And here one also understands why, facing this experience, one might feel mixed feelings, as it were, such as Roquentin’s “horrible ecstasy”, Coleridge's “sacred horror”, and Hadot’s terrifying and delicious anxiety. 

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I have the impression that one of the reasons why Chappell chooses Roquentin’s experience as a paradigmatic instance of dysepiphany depends on Chappell’s worldview, which is Christian theism (Chappell 2022, 385) and realism about values (Chappell 2022, Ch. 3). But one might think that the truth is that there is no creation, and that, at some ultimate level of description, there are no values (or just values that somehow depend on our standpoint). Moreover, and this is the crucial point, one might think that this view is, how to put it, good news. For one thing, it is (for those who believe it) the truth, and there is nothing higher and holier, for some people, than to know to be finally facing the truth about what is most fundamental. And even if this truth entails that values are illusions (or that there is nothing higher and nothing holy), still this discovery is perceived as valuable, precisely because it is the discovery of the truth about value (and much more). Eventually, these discoveries can also be regarded—or so do I, along with some Buddhists—as truths which, once properly understood and integrated, liberate us from illusion and suffering. And this is valuable relative to our aims, even if the truth is that, at some fundamental or absolute level, our aims are vacuous. 

MURDOCH’S EPIPHANY OF EXISTENCE 

One of Chappell’s preferred examples of epiphany is Murdoch’s experience of the kestrel. 

I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important. (Murdoch [1967] 1970, 82) 

Chappell seems to think of this as a religious experience; she thinks that “there is something numinous” (Chappell 2022, 219), and she thinks that this experience reveals that the correct response to reality is love (Chappell 2022, 11). I agree with all these points, provided that we understand “religious” and “numinous” broadly enough to include religious sensibilities that do not endorse the existence of God as creator. But it seems to me—contrary to Chappell, I think—that the source of vision in Murdoch’s experience is the same as that which strikes Roquentin in his experience of existence. And this is another reason why we should exercise caution in regarding Roquentin’s epiphany as a dysepiphany and, more generally, why we should be cautious in our interpretations of epiphanies. 

Murdoch says that she observes a hovering kestrel and then that “in a moment everything is altered.” She then describes the effect of her experience: the brooding self disappears, there is nothing but kestrel, and when she returns to thinking about the damage done to her prestige this matter seems less important. However, in this passage she does not say what, if anything, explains and eventually justifies her “change of consciousness” (Murdoch [1967] 1970, 83). Few lines later, though, she seems to offer her own interpretation of the source of her experience: 

We take a self-forgetful pleasure in the sheer alien pointless independent existence of animals, birds, stones, and trees. “Not how the world is, but that it is, is the mystical.” (Murdoch [1967] 1970, 83) 

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In the epiphany of the kestrel there is self-forgetfulness (“the brooding self disappears”) and there is some kind of aesthetic pleasure (the example is introduced as an experience of what is conventionally and traditionally called beauty). So, perhaps what is seen by Murdoch in the kestrel is, as she seems to suggest, its alien, pointless, independent existence. And by referring to Wittgenstein, she suggests that it is not how the kestrel is, or what is experienced (the kestrel) to provoke the change, but the fact that it exists. It is a kestrel, but it could have been anything else. But how does this purported truth explain and eventually justify the phenomenological change? Murdoch is not explicit about this—at least not in the immediate context of this remark—but let me offer some story which might be told at this juncture. When I am self-centered, I feel my desires (and their frustrations) as important. In this state of mind, though, I am oblivious of some crucial facts which are revealed in the epiphany: I am not the only one in the world (something beyond me exists, is real); the world around me is not reducible to my personal projections (the world is alien and independent); although in the world there are projections of value (my desires, our desires), things are in themselves pointless, as pointless as the naked existence of a hovering kestrel––as Murdoch says elsewhere , “All is vanity” is the beginning and end of ethics (Murdoch [1969] 1970, 70). When I experience these truths, the self-centered noise of the “fat relentless ego” (Murdoch [1969] 1970, 51) is silenced (and, if only for a moment, I am liberated from suffering). 

Now, this is merely a sketch of what might be condensed in a realization akin to the one lived by Murdoch. I don’t know whether this is correct as an interpretation of Murdoch’s experience; yet, what matters here is that the sketch is recognizable as potentially correct. And this, in turn, suggests that perhaps Murdoch’s experience is not fundamentally different from Roquentin’s. Like Murdoch and Wittgenstein, Roquentin also perceives the pointless existence of what exists. However, his reaction is not one of aesthetic pleasure, but rather of nausea and absurdity (and much more—he also speaks of “atrocious joy” (Sartre [1938] 1965, 159). Here it is important, for students of epiphanies, to wonder why such differences exist. One possibility is not so much that Roquentin was having a bad day, but rather that Murdoch and Roquentin are here focusing on different facets of the same “phenomenon.” There is beauty in the sheer pointless existence of what exists: Wittgenstein would concur, for “aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists” (Wittgenstein 1961, 86). And Roquentin—or some version of it in some nearby possible world––could concur as well, for everything is a “perfect free gift.” But when you appreciate what existence and pointlessness entail, then other reactions might emerge, such as nausea or angst. 

Much more could be said about epiphanies of existence in general and about the comparison between Murdoch and Roquentin’s epiphanies. To conclude, I hope the discussion so far succeeded in highlighting that it is hard to provide the correct interpretation of a given epiphany. As noted, many questions can be asked: what did I discover in this epiphany? (Did I discover existence or what?) What am I feeling? (Is this wonder or fear, or both?) What is the fact my feeling is reacting to? (Am I feeling wonder because existence has no creator or because existence has a creator?) Is what I am discovering good or bad news? (Is it good or bad if everything exists without an explanation?) And so on. The point is, it is hard to answer these questions and it is terribly important how we answer them: as Chappell notes, epiphanies have profound existential impacts on those who live them. This is why Chappell’s invitation to discuss epiphanies is more than urgent. I hope it will be widely accepted. 

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Notes

[1] For a discussion of the comparison between Coleridge’s experience of existence and Wittgenstein’s remarks on the experience of existence, see Zanetti 2023.

[2] Pessoa’s Fausto (Pessoa 2018) also speaks of horror in his experience of existence. For more on Pessoa’s epiphanies of existence see (Zanetti 2025c, 2025d, 2025e). 

[3] “I could of course wonder at the world around me being as it is. If for instance I had this experience while looking into the blue sky, I could wonder at the sky being blue as opposed to the case when it’s clouded. But that's not what I mean. I am wondering at the sky being whatever it is” (Wittgenstein 1965, 9). 

[4] Wittgenstein writes that the experience of wonder at the existence of the world is “exactly what people were referring to when they said that God had created the world” (Wittgenstein 1965, 14), but he also says that this is a simile and that when we try to remove the simile and simply state the facts that they purport to describe we find that there are no such facts. For more on this interpretation of Wittgenstein on this point see (Elliott 1993, 59), (Churchill 1994), and (Zanetti 2023, 2025b). That being said, although I think this is the correct interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Notebooks 1914-16, the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics, it is open to debate whether Wittgenstein changed his view about God in his post-1930 remarks. 

[5] Someone might suggest that Wittgenstein could accept that the world was explained by God’s act of creation, yet still feel wonder because he is a skeptic about humanity's access to God's explanations. I see two main problems with this alternative account of the source of wonder at the existence of the world. First, it fails to capture Wittgeinstein’s view, at least as far as his pre-1930 remarks on the issue are concerned. Second, on this view existence turns out to be only a relative miracle, for it is seen as an event that has some explanation, even if it is in principle unknowable. If the existence of the world is seen as an absolute miracle, then it must rather be seen as an event that has no possible explanation whatsoever, be that accessible or not to human reason. I thank a reviewer of this paper for pressing me to clarify this point.

[6] Except, of course, with the “possibility” that the sheer existence of everything denies, namely nothingness. But, as both Roquentin and Coleridge note, when you have this experience, you appreciate that nothingness is not possible: Coleridge writes, in the passage quoted, that “not to be, then, is impossible”, whereas Sartre writes that nothingness is “unthinkable” (Sartre [1938] 1965, 300). The same point is explicitly noted in Scheler’s experience of existence (refer to Scheler [1954] 1960, 98). 

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References

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Luca Zanetti © 2026

Author email: luca[dot]zanetti89[at]gmail[dot]com