Commentary

The Phenomenology of Encounters with Value

 Steven Gubka

Rice University, Houston, TX

Gubka, Steven. 2026. “Commentary on Epiphanies: The Phenomenology of Encounters with Value.” 

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 7, no. 2: 35-43. https://doi.org/10.33497/2026.winter.5. 

Abstract: Sophie Grace Chappell’s Epiphanies: The Ethics of Experience characterizes encounters with value as passive experiences similar to perceptual experience, with a special focus on epiphanies as significant encounters with value that may revolutionize our worldview. This lends itself to an attractive value epistemology that assimilates some knowledge of value into a model provided by perceptual knowledge. In opposition to Chappell, I argue that some encounters with value are active: sometimes, we experience value as a creation of our own agency. In my view of encounters with value, value is not always given to us through experience as if it were from the external world. I develop a sketch of how this view expands upon Chappell’s value epistemology and understanding of epiphanies.

Keywords: epiphany, phenomenology, value experience, moral epistemology, practical reasoning

INTRODUCTION

Sophie Grace Chappell’s Epiphanies: The Ethics of Experience is a phenomenological investigation into encounters with value. She characterizes these encounters as experiences about value that “come to us from the outside” (112). This account of encounters with value forms in part Chappell’s Recognitionalist Manifesto, so named because we experience these values as existing out in the world independently of ourselves, waiting for recognition (61). 

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Although encounters with value are distinct from and irreducible to other types of experience, Chappell describes a variety of similarities between encounters with value and perceptual experience. We do not infer the existence of these values, any more than we infer the existence of a tree from more basic elements of experience. Likewise, we are passive with respect to the values presented in these experiences insofar as they are not felt to be the product of our agency, and they do not seem to be derived from our desires. Indeed, sometimes we have an encounter with value that conflicts with our desires or existing attitudes about what is valuable. 

Of special focus to Chappell are epiphanies, which she invites us to think of as a central and focal case of encounters with value. An epiphany is an “existentially significant” encounter with value, a sudden realization that “teaches us something new” and perhaps even changes “the whole way we see the world” (113-114). Chappell’s work is bursting with helpful examples of epiphanies that illustrate these features. Consider the Persian King Xerxes and his encounter with a plane tree during his conquest, which moved him to the extent that he halted the march of his armies to adorn the tree with jewelry. Based on his reaction, it is plausible that Xerxes’s experience presented the beauty of the tree as independent of his agency, which called out for him to respond appropriately (115-117).

In addition to its account of phenomenology, the Recognitionalist Manifesto provides a distinctive approach to value epistemology: encounters with value give us evidential reasons for evaluative judgments and practical reasons to act on the basis of those values (113). In this way, encounters with value explain (at least some of) our knowledge about values, though Chappell emphasizes that this does not amount to (and in fact provides an argument against) a systematic moral theory (132-135). The upshot is that the Recognitionalist Manifesto offers a programmatic response to skepticism about knowledge of values. Our experience of values is broadly similar to our experience of objects of perception, which suggests that our knowledge of value is no more (though no less) mysterious than our knowledge of the objects of perception.[1] This value epistemology is consistent with and complementary to value realism, which is roughly the view that value exists independently of our minds, waiting to be recognized by us. (I use the term “value realism” rather than “moral realism” to call attention to how our encounters with value extend beyond moral value, including beauty or aesthetic value.)

Consider again Chappell’s example of Xerxes, whose epiphany gave him a reason to judge that the tree was beautiful and a reason to act in response to the beauty by adorning it. Note also that this insight applies to mundane encounters with value in addition to epiphanies: consider your anger in response to someone’s violation of your established boundaries. This encounter with (negative) value may give you a reason to judge that the violation was offensive, as well as a reason to act in response to that violation, such as by enforcing your boundaries.

I am broadly sympathetic to Chappell’s Recognitonalist Manifesto. I agree that it is in the nature of some experiences to give us reasons for evaluative judgments and actions, and our value epistemology should reflect this. However, I contend that Chappell overgeneralizes encounters with value: such experiences are not invariably passive. Specifically, I contend that some encounters with value are experienced as an active construction of those values that are felt to be a product of our agency. This, in turn, suggests that some values constitutively depend on that agency. It also helps explain how some epiphanies can be personal and so involve self-discovery.

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First, I argue that Chappell’s account of encounters with value neglects experiences that involve the active construction of our values. Some epiphanies and encounters with value more generally are experiences of an active construction of value: the value is experienced from the subject’s perspective as dependent on an exercise of the subject’s agency (construed to include one’s values, choices, and desires). I support my view through cases of active encounters with value. With these examples, I aim to illustrate the experience of exercising agency to create value. 

Second, I reflect on whether and how this alternative view of encounters with value affects our metaphysics of value and value epistemology. Here, I suggest that some evaluative knowledge is derived from self-knowledge, including in cases of personal epiphanies. This sketch expands upon Chappell’s proposal for a value epistemology that respects encounters with value (and epiphanies in particular).

ACTIVE ENCOUNTERS WITH VALUE

Let us begin with two epiphanies from novels with existentialist themes. Consider Albert Camus’s (1989) character Meursault, from The Stranger. At the end of the novel, Meursault has an epiphany wherein he reclaims his happiness despite his impending execution. His epiphany does not arrive spontaneously but as a product of his active engagement with the world as indifferent, as though he chooses to see the indifference of the world (and its similarity to himself in this way) as a reason for his happiness:

“And I felt ready to live it all again too. As if that blind rage had washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the first time, in that night alive with signs and stars, I opened myself to the gentle indifference of the world. Finding it so much like myself—so like a brother, really—I felt that I had been happy and that I was happy again.” (Camus 1989, 122-123)

Second, consider Fyodor Dostoevsky’s (2007) character Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov, who doubts God’s existence (or perhaps God’s goodness) after the death of his mentor, Father Zosima. Alyosha’s faith is not restored through additional evidence for his religious beliefs or a passive encounter with value. Instead, his faith is reaffirmed when he decides to show kindness to the ambitious and disreputable Grushenka.[2] In this epiphany, it is as though Alyosha chooses to see the possibility of good will between humans as a reason for his faith. In doing so, he heeds advice from Father Zosima, who does not advocate for weighing arguments or passive reception with respect to the question of God’s existence, but instead exhorts an intentional pursuit of camaraderie:

[You can be convinced] by the experience of active love. Strive to love your neighbour actively and indefatigably. In as far as you advance in love you will grow surer of the reality of God and of the immortality of your soul. If you attain to perfect self-forgetfulness in the love of your neighbour, then you will believe without doubt, and no doubt can possibly enter your soul. (Dostoevsky 2007, 107)

These examples admit multiple reasonable interpretations (as good literature often does). In particular, Chappell might respond that in these cases, the characters in question do make choices that enable or causally contribute to their epiphanies, but the epiphanies themselves are encounters with value that the characters experience as independent of themselves, and not as dependent on exercises of agency. 

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In order to bolster my case for active encounters with value, let us consider a somewhat more mundane scenario of deliberation about a difficult decision, which I will argue is an epiphany and an instance of an active encounter with value. 

Katie’s Compersion. Katie is reflecting on her romantic relationships. In the past, she approached relationships without much forethought, often adapting herself to the preferences of her partners. As such, some of her relationships have been monogamous, and others were non-monogamous. Now Katie is deliberating about whether she should commit to one style of relationship over the other. She tallies up the reasons for and against monogamy and non-monogamy, but as far as Katie can tell, her reasons do not decisively favor one style to the exclusion of the other. 

Later, Katie observes a romantic interest of hers respond enthusiastically to someone else’s flirty banter. She makes an effort to see this in a positive light for him, which involves managing her envy. As a result, she experiences a type of joy about his happiness. Although Katie already knows that romance can contribute positively to someone’s happiness, her joy is accompanied by the sudden realization that she especially values experiencing this type of joy on behalf of others. She decides to pursue non-monogamous relationships in the future, and her choice feels authentic and rational to her.

With respect to this case, I claim that (1) Katie’s realization involves an encounter with value, (2) Katie’s encounter with value is active insofar as Katie experiences that value as produced by her own agency, and (3) Katie’s active encounter with value (and others like it) suggest that at least some value in the world is a product of our agency and so without independent existence. In this section, I will concern myself with the first two claims about the phenomenology of encounters with value, and turn to the third in the next section.

Consider Katie’s deliberation prior to her experience of romantic compersion—the type of joy about someone else’s happiness with respect to their romantic life. From her perspective, whether she should be monogamous is underdetermined by her reasons. For example, one reason to prefer monogamous relationships is that they create a type of intimacy through romantic and sexual exclusivity, and one reason to prefer non-monogamous relationships is that they create space to acknowledge and act upon new romantic and sexual attraction. Katie has encountered the different ways that these different types of relationships are valuable, but discovers in deliberation that those reasons underdetermine what she should do. It seems to her as though either approach to relationships would be rational, but the decision is difficult in a particular way because those respective values do not decisively favor the decision to live monogamously or not.

Katie chooses to pursue non-monogamous relationships after she has a realization: that she values romantic compersion, and in such a way that it helps provide a decisive reason for non-monogamy. It is significant here that Katie’s realization is about herself. Recall that Katie was already familiar with what is valuable about non-monogamy before her realization, including the fact that additional romantic relationships can enrich the happiness of her romantic partners. Let us suppose that she was also previously acquainted with the pleasure of romantic compersion. So Katie’s realization is not (only) about these reasons for non-monogamy—neither of which were decisive in her deliberation before her realization. Rather, Katie realizes that she herself values romantic compersion, and specifically, she values it to the extent that she treats it as a decisive reason for non-monogamy. In other words, if Katie did not value romantic compersion in this way (such that she sees it as a 

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decisive reason in favor of non-monogamy) then she would have been unable to conclude her deliberation about whether to be monogamous. 

I propose that Katie’s realization is an epiphany about herself and an active encounter with value. She encounters the value of non-monogamous relationships as a product of what she finds valuable about them: their potential for romantic compersion. In other words, Katie has an experience that presents the value of non-monogamous relationships in a way that feels contingent upon her agency. It is what Katie values about non-monogamy that provides a decisive reason for it, and not (only) what is valuable about non-monogamy independently of Katie’s agency. 

Active encounters with value are consistent with our ordinary practice of giving reasons for our actions to each other. Imagine that Katie’s friend asks for Katie’s reasons for her non-monogamous lifestyle. Katie may respond as follows: “I have been happy in both types of relationships for different reasons, and it was difficult to compare them. Ultimately I discovered that the happiness that I experience when I see that my partners are also happy in other romantic relationships is important to me. But I understand that other people do not experience romantic compersion or value it as much as me, so I would not recommend non-monogamy on this basis for everyone.” Justifications like Katie’s that appeal to what one personally values, rather than to what is valuable independently of oneself and so applicable to everyone, are commonplace and passed over without special criticism.

One way to understand Katie’s deliberation is through Ruth Chang’s two-stage model of deliberation (2009). In hard cases where our reasons underdetermine what we should do, Chang suggests that we can undergo two stages of deliberation. In the first stage, one attempts to decide what to do based on reasons given by the options themselves, but ultimately, these reasons run out and so underdetermine what one should do. In the second stage, one takes a consideration in favor of one option to be an additional reason for oneself (or a reason with additional weight), thereby creating a reason that may decisively determine what one should do. In Chappell’s terms, the first stage of deliberation may involve passive encounters with value, where we recognize the value of our options as independently existing of our agency. My proposal is that in the second stage of deliberation, we may have active encounters with value, where we create additional value through our agency in favor of some option. Thus, in cases like Katie’s where the first stage of deliberation has been exhausted without a decisive consideration in favor of mutually exclusive choices, active encounters with value plausibly play an important role in the second stage of deliberation by providing a decisive reason that concludes the deliberation, albeit one related to value dependent on agency.

This framework also helps illuminate my interpretation of Meursault and Alyosha’s epiphanies. To simplify, Meursault chooses to take the world’s indifference as a reason for his happiness, and Alyosha chooses to take Grushenka’s kindness as a reason for his faith, even though neither of these considerations by themselves is decisive for them initially. These epiphanies take place after their reasons have already run out and underdetermined what they should do (or feel or believe).

An objector may argue that Katie values romantic compersion precisely because it is an experience of something valuable independently of her agency. Suppose that in a prior experience of romantic compersion, Katie had an encounter with the value of her partners having other successful romantic relationships. Moreover, this value

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struck her as independent of her agency. Is it not because of this value, which is given to Katie as if independently existing through a passive encounter with value, that Katie makes her decision to be non-monogamous?

I agree that Katie’s realization does involve this value of her partners having other successful romantic relationships, which she may have become aware of through a passive encounter with value. However, Katie’s decision to pursue non-monogamous relationships is not based solely on this value, but also the fact that she values it especially. Otherwise, Katie’s deliberation about whether to be monogamous would not have been difficult in the first place—it would not have been a hard case where reasons underdetermine what Katie should do. Absent an argument for the impossibility of such hard cases, I suggest that we take this phenomenology of this deliberation at face value and accept that one’s reasons can underdetermine what one should do. This opens up the space for active encounters with value to do work in helping to conclude such deliberations.

Perhaps we can elucidate Katie’s valuing romantic compersion in the following way: it consists in (at least in part) a desire to be the kind of person who is open to the joy of romantic compersion. Such a desire would help explain why she intends to pursue non-monogamous relationships and manage feelings of jealousy to become that kind of person. This account also helps explain how Katie’s decision is rational and authentic. It is rational because she acts on the basis of reasons, and it is authentic because those reasons are a product of (or provided by) her own desires. 

PERSONAL EPIPHANIES AS VALUE EPISTEMOLOGY

Given that some encounters with value are active, what follows about our value epistemology, which is an integral part of Chappell’s Recognitionalist Manifesto? In particular, does this entail that some values are a product of our choices in a way that undermines value realism? Here, I offer some brief speculative thoughts about new directions in value epistemology that arguably broaden rather than contract our ways of knowing about value.

The phenomenology of value is arguably a guide to the metaphysics of value, albeit a fallible one. Our experiences present values, and this is consistent with and perhaps evidence of value realism, though this does not rule out the possibility that our experiences can misrepresent what is valuable. Nonetheless, the existence of active encounters with value suggests that some value does not exist independently of our agency, but instead depends constitutively on our choices. For example, the value of Katie’s romantic relationships is constituted (in part) by her choice to value that type of relationship. If value realism is inconsistent with this type of value, and we do not have a reason to doubt the general veracity of active encounters with value, then value realism is called into question.[3] Regardless, active encounters with value are not inconsistent with what I take to be the spirit of value realism, especially for Chappell: there are still mind-independent values out there that call out for our recognition and response. It is just that there are also mind-dependent values constituted, at least in part, by our choices. 

Recall that the parallel between passive encounters with value and perceptual experience suggests that (some) evaluative knowledge is akin to perceptual knowledge. How should we account for active encounters with value in our value epistemology? I suggest that our evaluative knowledge from active encounters with value is similar

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to self-knowledge. To the extent that we can acquire knowledge about ourselves, including knowledge of what we desire to find valuable, we have a route to evaluative knowledge, specifically of created value.

Moreover, we can categorize one type of self-knowledge conducive to our evaluative knowledge as personal epiphany. Unlike epiphanies that direct us to recognize and respond to the value outside of ourselves, some epiphanies are personal insofar as they are directed at the recognition of what we ourselves desire and choose to value. This broadening of epiphanies to include discoveries about oneself demonstrates how Katie’s active encounter with value is a genuine epiphany. Through her deliberation, she makes a discovery of existential significance about herself: she desires to be a person who values certain things, which informs her choice to make those things valuable for herself, and this, in turn, guides her decision about her future relationships. More generally, then, when we face a difficult decision and what we should do finally dawns upon us, it is not always because we have made a discovery about our options, but sometimes because we have had an epiphany about ourselves

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Notes

[1] See Sarah McGrath (2019) for a prominent example of recent work that attempts to demystify moral knowledge through assimilation to more general ways of knowing about the world.

[2] Dennis Auweele (2016) helpfully compares Dostoevsky’s characters Alyosha and Ivan (who rejects God) with respect to their religious epiphanies and visions in a way that supports this theme.

[3] It is not clear to me that value realism is inconsistent with the type of value represented by active encounters with value, as much depends on precisely how values are meant to be understood as independent from us. For a discussion of the difficulties of formulating moral realism in particular, and a proposed solution, see Russ Shafer-Landau 2003 (Ch. 1).

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References

1. Auweele, Dennis Vanden. 2016. “Existential Struggles in Dostoevsky’s the Brothers Karamazov.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (3): 279-296.

2. Camus, Albert. 1989. The Stranger. Translated by Matthew Ward. New York: Vintage Books.

3. Chang, Ruth. 2009. “Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity.” In Reasons for Action, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall, 243-71. New York: Cambridge University Press.

4. Chappell, Sophie Grace. 2022. Epiphanies: An Ethics of Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5. Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 2007. The Brothers Karamazov. Translated by Constance Garnett. New York: Signet Classics.

6. McGrath, Sarah. 2019. Moral Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

7. Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. New York: Oxford University Press.

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 Steven Gubka © 2026

Author email: steven[dot]gubka[at]gmail[dot]com