Editorial

Introduction to the Book Symposium on 

Heidi Maibom’s The Space Between: How Empathy Really Works

Thomas Schramme

University of Liverpool, UK

Schramme, Thomas. 2026. “Editorial: Introduction to the Book Symposium on Heidi Maibom’s The Space Between: How Empathy Really Works.” 

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 8, no. 1: v-xii. https://doi.org/10.33497/2026.earlysummer.0iii. 

Abstract: This brief introduction to the critical exchange about Heidi Maibom's monograph The Space Between: How Empathy Really Works first explains the context of Maibom's contributions to empathy research and then summarises the main points addressed in the individual commentaries and responses. Finally, a few possible avenues for future research are explored.

Keywords: empathy, perspective-taking, impartiality, objectivity, Maibom 

INTRODUCTION

Probably no other philosopher has done as much for the advancement of empathy research as Heidi Maibom. In the past, she has published an important textbook (Maibom 2020), edited a large handbook on the philosophy of empathy (Maibom 2017), as well as a more specialised anthology on empathy and morality (Maibom 2014a). Her most recent book, The Space Between: How Empathy Really Works (Maibom 2022), is the target of a debate between Maibom and her commentators in this special issue. In this brief introduction, I will first describe some background of current empathy research and then summarise the commentaries as well as the main lessons from the documented discussion. I will finish by highlighting, from my own perspective, further avenues for future research and philosophical debates.

Maibom's way into empathy research was via the debate on folk psychology, which had its heyday around 30 years ago. This was a debate about the cognitive mechanisms used to ascribe mental states to other people. One 

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popular type of theory explained folk psychological processes in terms of the application of a theory about the mind, using mental concepts, such as belief and desire, and the application of psychological rules. An alternative account thought of the relevant psychological processes as simulating the mental life of others. Interestingly, Maibom was already sceptical about the then fashionable construction of the debate in terms of two opposing teams, theory theory and simulationism, which quarrelled over the best explanation of folk psychological processes. Her approach was to explain the pertinent phenomena from the point of view of model theory. From this perspective, humans model the mind of others in relation to certain purposes. Hence, there is no preferred route to understanding others (Maibom 2003, 2007). In these earlier publications, Maibom did not refer to empathy, but the folk psychological framework re-ignited the debate in analytical philosophy. The folk psychology debate in philosophy had always been closely connected to theories of social cognition in other disciplines and, in general, to scientific approaches. Modern sciences discuss social cognition within a subjectivist framework, theorising mainly about what is going on in the mind, or indeed the brain, of an empathiser. This influence is still visible today, also in Maibom's work, and it contrasts with other philosophical traditions that discuss empathy and social cognition from a phenomenological point of view (e.g. Zahavi 2014). In this approach, empathy is an embodied and intersubjective process. Maibom is aware of this tradition, but it does not take centre stage.

As indicated, an important feature of Maibom's work has always been her keen interest in empirical research on empathy, which is mainly performed in social psychology and social neuroscience. This has also led to interesting, more applied, avenues within her theorising, specifically in relation to pathologies of empathy, for instance psychopathy (e.g., Maibom 2014b). Maibom's scope of expertise regarding empathy research is already impressive but even more remarkable is how careful she makes use of these empirical findings. Some philosophers tend to pick suitable publications from other disciplines that can corroborate their own independently devised theory. In contrast, Maibom acknowledges the fact that psychological research is often conflicting, and she develops her own philosophical accounts accordingly. This is important, for instance in relation to the discussion on psychopathy, where many philosophers, including myself, have been obsessed with identifying a lack of empathy to explain moral deficits. A more cautious approach is empirically more adequate, despite having less direct impact on foundational debates in moral philosophy.

The Space Between is of course based on Maibom's previous work and expertise. This makes reading the book a highly rewarding experience. It will appeal to newcomers to the debate, not least due to the engaging style of writing, yet it will also offer a lot to empathy experts, as can be seen in the present exchange between Maibom and her commentators. I happen to know that the book has long been in the making. There is even an inconspicuous trace of the previous title, which was Knowing Me, Knowing You (Maibom 2022, 9). The focus of the published book is on relational matters, on the perspectival space between persons, and on the consequences of empathic processes on objectivity and impartiality. So, the book's title change is appropriate to emphasise the relational space between persons. But, alternatively, perhaps Maibom simply fell out of love with ABBA?

THE CRITICAL EXCHANGE

As would be expected from a philosophical exchange about a book publication, the focal points concern conceptual clarifications, as well as explanatory gaps and possible expansions of the arguments to other areas. More specifically, the commentaries centre around the concepts of perspective-taking (Fullarton) and affective empathy (Rieger), they discuss the neglected  role  of  reason in morality (Hildebrand), and they speculate  about

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the application of empathy in relation to other species (Waldberg and Andrews) and about non-empathic forms of perspective-taking (Huemer). 

Catherine Fullarton firstly queries the conceptual relationship of empathy and perspective-taking, and secondly explores the roles of empathy, perception and imagination in the process of perspective-taking. To Maibom, empathy seems to be a possible trigger of perspective-taking. An empathiser experiences a differing perspective and might therefore be prompted to further explore, in a gradual imaginative process, the other person's point of view. This would make empathy a precursor of perspective-taking. Alternatively, empathy might itself be a form of perspective-taking. In her response, Maibom clarifies that to her empathy is a broad term that covers a large range of phenomena. In terms of the queried conceptual relationship, she understands empathy to involve perspective-taking as one aspect. Perspective-taking includes affective elements, which are often conceptually connected to empathy, yet empathising is itself already experiencing another person's perspective, so not just a matter of perspective-taking. How to make sense of the specific conceptual relationship between empathy and perspective-taking is not Maibom's primary concern.

Fullarton further queries Maibom's integration of the phenomenological approach to empathy, which puts an emphasis on perceptual, as opposed to imaginative, processes. For Maibom, perception, empathising, and imagining, all seem to be mechanisms of perspective-taking. Fullarton is sceptical whether this does justice to the phenomenological tradition, especially in relation to the dangers of misconstruing the mental life of others when imaginatively presuming their perspectives. After all, presumptions can quickly become presumptuous. Maibom responds that perspective-taking is a process that can adopt another person's centre of agency to various degrees. Humans employ different processes in building the space between, and they get to a certain point, which often suffices to achieve specific purposes. The limits of perspective-taking are real, but they are also not particularly threatening.

Florian Rieger attempts to clarify in more detail Maibom's conceptualisation of affective empathy. Affective empathy needs to be distinguished from emotional contagion, which is passively experienced and does not involve a clear distinction between oneself and the other, as well as from sympathy, which includes pro-social motivation. Yet, Maibom assumes that empathy can involve vicarious feeling; feeling as if we were experiencing what the other feels. So, this seems to be a form of feeling for the other, which again is close to a common formulation of sympathy. Rieger tries to make progress by assuming a close relationship of affective empathy to vicarious reactive attitudes, as discussed by Peter Strawson a while ago (Strawson 1974; originally published in 1962). Vicarious reactive attitudes, such as indignation, involve a concern for the other. Rieger claims that the close connection of affective empathy in Maibom's analysis sits uncomfortably with her emphasis on imagination in perspective-taking because imagination does not seem to necessarily include affect. In sum, this criticism hints at the moral infusion, as it were, of empathic processes, which can presumably be highlighted by employing Strawson's account.

In her response to Rieger, Maibom first insists that affective empathy is one form of perspective-taking; there is hence no contrast to imaginative routes. Perspective-taking is the core and overarching focal point of her account, and there are both cognitive and affective mechanisms involved in this process. Finally, Maibom insists on the distinction of empathy and compassion or other pro-social phenomena. So, Strawson's terminology does not easily fit her account of the space between.

Carl Hildebrand points at limits of empathy from the point of view of moral rationalism. His criticism specifically targets Maibom's assumption regarding the beneficial role of perspective-taking in achieving a greater

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level of impartiality. Rather, empathy needs to be guided by reason. One example might be cases where a person aims to empathise with someone else but fails, perhaps because the perspective of the other is too alien. Yet, from a moral point of view, we need to respect those we cannot empathise with. To clarify this further, we would need to learn more about the purposes of empathy that Maibom endorses. Hildebrand doubts that empathy can achieve impartiality, respect, and care, which however seem to be the achievements that Maibom assumes. Perhaps empathy is sometimes beneficial, especially in terms of epistemic enrichment, but it does not seem to be necessary for common social purposes, and especially not strictly required for morality. From this point of view, the often stark contrast between rationalism and sentimentalism would evaporate.

In response, Maibom first clarifies the role she assigns to empathy for morality: She does not deem empathy necessary or sufficient for moral judgement or motivation, and she is not opposed to assigning reason a role in moral matters. Indeed, her specific argument undermines the rationale of the philosophical dispute between moral sentimentalism and rationalism because emotion and reason are not separable phenomena. Maibom goes on by questioning a common tacit assumption about reason itself, namely that it is leading to objective results. Perspective-taking, in its experiential, affective form, makes things relevant to us, which is a different route from reason. In sum, perspective-taking does not determine justified norms of morality, but it has an essential function in the process.

Elizabeth Waldberg and Kristin Andrews expand Maibom's defence of the far-reaching achievements in taking the perspective of others. They argue that humans can even empathise with non-human animals, at least given they are willing to try. The benefits of inter-species empathy are primarily fleshed out in terms of epistemic gains. Humans could hence gain new information about the world via empathic processes. Challenges are mainly to be found in circumstantial hurdles, for instance power differentials, not in a lack of capacity. These hurdles are not specific to inter-species empathy and can therefore be tackled in the same way as we can make attempts to overcome empathic hurdles in relation to other human beings. Waldberg and Andrews further discuss possible strategies to gain more ground for a shared perspectival space between humans and other animals, especially by reducing the impact of biases.  

Maibom agrees that empathic understanding can indeed often go quite far and does not seem to suffer from absolute barriers, at least as far as other members of our species are targeted. Accordingly, even very alien perspectives can gradually be integrated into the space between. For the purpose of taking a moral stance towards others, including other animals, this will usually be a feasible route. Human beings might however lack the willingness to take the perspective of others, which can have detrimental moral effects, of course. This is particularly pertinent to the moral status assigned to non-human animals. Yet the limitations of commonly shown moral concern are not due to empathy's limitations. 

Wolfgang Huemer also mainly aims at an expansion of Maibom's theory. He is particularly interested in less direct and less individualistic forms of perspective-taking, where empathy plays a smaller role. Perspectives – i.e. specific ways of looking at something from a point of view – can be techniques of representation shared by groups and present also in scientific theories. When we aim at understanding others, we can gradually add more information to increase the intensity of perspective-taking. This is usually cognitively demanding, because a lot of data must be decoded and applied. Maibom's discussion of empathy hints at a more direct experience and affective apprehension of another person's perspective. Yet, as Huemer assumes, empathic processes seem to be restricted to face-to-face encounters. Even where empathy works indirectly, say through a narrative account, it is focused on individuals. The individualised perspective-taking furthermore seems to guarantee the concern for

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others that is also often the result of empathy. This focus on the individual, Huemer argues, might however get in the way of a more detached look at the group dynamics and general group-related factors. The latter approach might be more amenable to understanding and considering the interests of disadvantaged groups. So, concern might be secured through non-affective and hence non-empathic routes. This does not undermine Maibom's account but establishes additional contexts where the notion of perspective-taking can be employed.

Maibom is not opposed to Huemer's suggestions for expanding the argument to less individualised forms of perspective-taking, though she defends, in the first part of her response, the significance, which is often neglected in moral philosophy, of direct interpersonal encounters for morality. Maibom further queries in what way it is actually possible to take the perspective of a group. This would have to be explained in more detail. In sum, and as before, empathic perspective-taking is to be seen as one, not the only one, mechanism of understanding others. 

WHAT NEXT FOR PHILOSOPHICAL EMPATHY RESEARCH?

As explained, one of the many interesting claims that Maibom discusses in her study is the necessarily perspectival nature of human perception and knowledge acquisition. So, we cannot start our enquiries about the world or others from a neutral or objective point of view. Rather, neutrality and objectivity are achievements of perspective-taking. In this way, empathy is a road to enhanced epistemic outcomes. Empathy is not introducing bias into human thinking and feeling, but instead reducing the impact of biases, which are themselves the starting points of perspectival cognition. When appreciating the corrective function, it needs to be acknowledged that empathy is a complex process, not just a simple snapshot experience of others.

Perspective-taking, according to Maibom, is not merely an imaginative, cognitively demanding, process. What others call affective empathy, a form of feeling-with another person, is also a form of perspective-taking. This is helpful but might perhaps be conceptually confusing, since some empathy researchers closely align perspective-taking with cognitive empathy (e.g. Spaulding 2017; Spaulding et al 2022, 63f.). In contrast, in Maibom's account, perspective-taking is an embodied experience that involves affect. She says: "What does the nature of emotions have to do with perspective taking? Just this. If you can get yourself into the same affective space that another person inhabits with a similar object, you are taking his or her perspective. You do so by embodying or inhabiting the perspective he or she inhabits. Or, if we want to be more modest, we might say you are inhabiting a very similar or overlapping perspective" (Maibom 2022, 144; emphasis in original). Accordingly, affective and cognitive elements of empathy are combined in embodied perspective-taking. 

Perhaps further clarification will be required here? Perspective-taking is indeed an elaborate and often strenuous process. But what about forms of affective empathy that seem to "hit" us immediately? Are these also cases of taking the perspective of someone else? Are they perhaps rather examples of perspective-having, because there is no clear-cut active taking of a perspective by an empathiser? Maibom uses this terminology, if only briefly (Maibom 2022, 129, 246). For example, how should we make sense of Huckleberry Finn's feelings regarding the run-away slave Jim in Mark Twain's famous novel? In the narrative, it becomes obvious that Huck believes it would be right to turn in Jim, but he cannot bring himself to do it. Some philosophers have read this as an example of social feelings having moral value because they can cause morally right action (e.g., Bennett 1974). Indeed, what Huckleberry goes through seems to be related to empathy, because he feels Jim’s anguish. In our context of discussion, it might hence be asked whether Huck takes the perspective of Jim, or rather feels something in relation to Jim, something that can be described as a feeling that the other is a fellow human being. At least this is how I would be prone to describe the case (Schramme 2024, 164). So, perspective-taking, even in the embodied form, might not be the only way how empathy works.

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Another issue that will likely lead to more philosophical discussions in the future is the role of bias in epistemic processes and of partiality in interpersonal encounters. Maibom plausibly identifies the perspectival nature of attempts to understand the world and other people. In this sense, biases are normal and hence, indeed, the negative connotation of the word itself is unhelpful (Maibom 2022, 6). But if that's the case, then overcoming biases does not seem to be a straightforward aim of intersubjective encounters. If biases, i.e., specific subjective perspectives, are normal, why should we overcome their limitations? In other words, objectivity is not a value in its own right. Indeed, as Maibom herself says: "dehumanizing is the mark of the ultra-objective stance" (Maibom 2022, 218). To be sure, in specific contexts, overcoming our standpoint and integrating others' perspective might be required, for instance when trying to render a just decision in situations of conflict of interests. But this does not make objectivity a plausible aim of all encounters in the space between. 

I don't want to suggest that Maibom reduces the space between to the aim of objectivity or impartiality. For instance, she considers demands of interpersonal relationships (Maibom 2022, 230). Yet, impartiality is her main focus, most likely because she is interested in the moral significance of empathy. When expanding the philosophical viewpoint to more contexts, it seems that different types of social encounters call for different forms of interactive engagement. In some of these contexts, empathic processes can be helpful because they lead to more objectivity. In other contexts, a firm form of subjectivity, disregard for other persons' perspectives, and perhaps even close-mindedness might be fully adequate attitudes. It would be interesting to figure out whether specific contexts require specific attitudes, and of course it would be another important philosophical task to understand what role empathic processes play in these different contexts. So, as always, further research is required.

Maibom's study and her previous work have been inspirational in putting empathy on the map of many different philosophical conversations: in philosophy of psychology, epistemology, and moral philosophy, to name only the most obvious areas. She has also defended empathy against critics who assumed an overly simple account by showing how empathy really works in a complex and skillful way. The conversation with her critics in this special issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion will further animate future debates. 

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Acknowledgement

Many thanks to two anonymous reviewers for providing helpful comments on draft versions of all contributions, to the editor of the journal, Cecilea Mun, for unfailing support, and to the authors for making work on this critical exchange such a pleasant experience. 

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References

1. Bennett, Jonathan. 1974. “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.” Philosophy 49 (188): 123–134.

2. Maibom, Heidi L. 2003. “The Mindreader and the Scientist.” Mind & Language 18 (3): 296–315.

3. ______. 2007. “Social Systems.” Philosophical Psychology 20 (5): 557-578.

4. ______. (ed.). 2014a. Empathy and Morality. New York: Oxford University Press. 

5. ______. 2014b. “Without Fellow Feeling.” In Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, edited by Thomas Schramme, pp. 91-114. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

6. ______. (ed.). 2017. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Empathy. London: Routledge.

7. ______. 2020. Empathy. New York: Routledge. 

8. ______. 2022. The Space Between: How Empathy Really Works. New York: Oxford University Press.

9. Schramme, Thomas. 2024. “Empathy as a Means to Understand People.” Philosophical Explorations, 27 (2): 157–170. 

10. Spaulding, Shannon. 2017. “Cognitive Empathy.” In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, pp. 13–21. New York: Routledge.

11. Spaulding, Shannon, Rita Svetlova, and Hannah Read. 2022. “The Nature of Empathy.” In Neuroscience and Philosophy, edited by  Felipe De Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 49-77. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

12. Strawson, Peter F. 1974. “Freedom and Resentment.” In Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, edited by Peter F. Strawson, pp. 1-28. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

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Thomas Schramme © 2026

Author email: T[dot]Schramme[at]liverpool[dot]ac[dot]uk